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ABSTRACT
Caught in an Undertow of Corruption:




Dr. Kenneth Fernandez, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor o f Political Science 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Ethno-nationalism continues to be perceived by the international community as the 
primary source of Bosnia’s political instability, and is seen as the leading cause of its 
stalled democratic consolidation. This thesis explores this premise, and questions whether 
international policy debates regarding Bosnia’s future should continue to be framed in 
these terms.
In-depth exploratory interviews were employed to examine political attitudes within a 
sample o f thirty-one middle class Bosnian citizens. Findings suggest that middle class 
Bosnians are forming new political attitudes. Perceptions of corruption among Bosnia’s 
middle class may be emerging as a barrier to democratic consolidation. Since a politically 
engaged middle class has been a vital underpinning of previous democratic transitions, 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina's thirteen-year political morass is a widely recognized problem. 
At a recent speaking engagement in May 2008, at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze 
School of Advanced International Studies, the current High Representative in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Miroslav Lajcak, described Bosnia's unchanging political situation as "near 
paralysis" (OHR, 2008). The United States Institute o f Peace recently described Bosnia 
as a "dysfunctional state" (USIP, 2008), and in a 2008 interview with the Observer,
Paddy Ashdown, Bosnia's fourth High Representative, stated that "after 10 years of 
progress which made Bosnia the world's most successful exercise in post-conflict 
reconstruction, there is a real threat of Bosnia breaking up again" (Observer, 2008). 
Giuliano Amato, Chairman o f the International Commission on the Balkans, has 
described the western Balkans as an “isolated ghetto” (International Commission on the 
Balkans, 2005).
The policy discourse of politicians like Lajcak and Ashdown, and a premise shared by 
many academics that study Bosnia (for example see Tuathail (2006), Hayden (2005), and 
Touquet and Vermeersch (2008)) holds that ethno-nationalism remains Bosnia's primary 
(and perhaps only) source of political instability. The ethno-nationalism theme is also 
commonly found in various European Union documents such as the amiual Bosnia and
Herzegovina Progress Reports’ prepared and published by the European Commission. 
This thesis questions this fundamental proposition. It does not argue that nationalism has 
become unimportant. Rather, it asks whether problems other than ethno-nationalism may 
be emerging as additional sources of political instability. Findings tentatively support this 
hypothesis.
The empirical research for this thesis involves a qualitative assessment of political 
attitudes among a small sample of Bosnia’s middle class. In February 2008, thirty-one 
middle class Bosnian citizens participated in confidential, in-depth interviews. 
Participants were provided an opportunity to anonymously express deeply held attitudes 
toward their government. Participant responses reveal disillusiomnent with Bosnian and 
EU governance, and democracy. Symptoms include political apathy, a declining 
confidence in democracy, a desire to leave the country, and a viewpoint that some non- 
democratic methods of governance may be an acceptable solution to the country's severe 
corruption problem. Importantly, many participants do not now view democracy as what 
Schmitter and Guilhot (2000) term the “only game in town”. All participants vigorously 
described endemic political corruption as the primary source o f this disaffection. The 
qualitative conclusions drawn by this thesis are not statistically generalizable to a larger 
population. However, the interview transcriptions are so striking that they raise legitimate 
concerns that a larger percentage of the country’s middle class, may be withdrawing from 
civic society.
’ The Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Reports are an annual report from the 
European Commission to the European Council and Parliament addressing progress made 
toward European Union membership.
The likelihood of such a trend is worrisome. A democracy that does not vigorously 
engage its middle class effectively amounts to a form of despotism that Tocqueville 
(1840, Volume 11, Section 4) concluded "conditions, softens, bends, and guides men's 
wills". A democracy in this condition "compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies 
its people" (ibid.), and poses one of its greatest dangers (ibid.). If future academic 
research satisfactorily links Bosnia's endemic corruption to widespread political 
alienation, it would signify the emergence of a new risk to Bosnia’s nascent democracy 
and EU membership plans.
A country’s middle class includes business people, professionals, shopkeepers, 
teachers, civil-servants, managers, technicians, clerical, and sales workers (Huntington, 
1991, p. 66). This social group contributes to the democratic decision making process 
tlirough the influence of its own distinct self-serving attitudes and agendas. An articulated 
and coalesced middle class has both a witting and unwitting influence on a less 
sophisticated, malleable, and manipulable general public. Through this influence, it 
shapes social choice and public opinion formation. A non-partisan middle class provides 
rhetorical ammunition for the less-infbrmed, and helps the public distinguish sound 
policy from ideological obfuscation. This elite sector can play an especially important 
role during political transition. In virtually every country the most active supporters of 
democratization have come from the urban middle class (Huntington, 1991, p. 67).
During the “transition years” in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, for example, 
middle class elites opposing earlier socialist regimes emerged to unify and make a 
constructive contribution to democratization (Higley and Pakulski, 2000, p. 125). In 
contrast, Slovakian, Bulgarian, and Russian, legacy “parties of power” have remained
dominant and continue to “ride roughshod” over their opponents (ibid.). In Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, where opposition elites still remain weak, nationalist elites that emerged 
during the civil war have effectively done the same.
In a worst-case scenario, political alienation could drive Bosnia’s middle class to 
endorse, and perhaps influence others to endorse, a political party that convincingly 
promises more effective governance through non-democratic means. Its democratization 
could thus come to a standstill or slide backwards. At best, there is a distinct possibility 
that a decline in the public engagement o f Bosnia’s middle class, over the long-term, will 
allow the continued stranglehold o f ethno-nationalism in the political arena, further 
weakening the country's already lethargic democratic and economic reforni process. 
Bosnia could continue to lose legitimacy in the eyes o f European Union member states 
and ultimately may suffer economic and political sanctions due to its poor performance. 
Recent examples of this scenario are found in Bulgaria, which gained EU membership in 
2007, but may already see billions in EU funding frozen amid fears of fraud (Economist, 
2008); and Turkey, where a prolonged EU membership process has caused a decline in 
local public support for membership (Civilitas Research, 2005).
Today, the political trajectory for Bosnia is aimed at European Union 
membership. Bosnia is currently categorized as a “potential candidate”, participating in 
what is termed the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) to guide it down its long 
road to accession. The overarching goal o f the SAP is to compel Bosnia to enact 
institutional reform, on its own initiative, that will facilitate coordination with the heavily 
institutionalized European Union. The prospect o f EU membership is anticipated to 
serve as a stimulus for nationalist elites to redirect their attention to economic reform.
ethnie tolerance, and regional security. Compliance with the many prerequisites for 
membership, commonly referred to as the “conditionality criteria”, also assures existing 
EU member states of the validity of additional enlargement. Although the SAP process is 
succeeding in building local democratic institutions, the “conditionality criteria” offer 
few direct incentives for Bosnia to escalate its fight against corruption, which has seen 
little success since the civil war ended in late 1995. If further research finds political 
alienation widespread, this thesis recommends that the EU should consider "raising the 
bar" for membership by including measurable reductions in corruption as part o f its 
“conditionality criteria”.
Although this study is not historical in scope, it begins by providing an account of 
Bosnia’s recent political evolution in order to correctly frame what follows.
Consequently, Chapter 2 provides a description of Bosnia’s current sociopolitical 
problems and then defines Bosnia’s trajectory to European Union membership within the 
context of Dayton and the Security Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Chapter 3 and 4 
provide a theoretical basis for this paper. Chapter 3 explains thé dependency of 
democracy on legitimacy. Chapter 4 explores the nature of public opinion and its parallel 
relationship to legitimacy. Chapter 5 evaluates corruption’s corrosive effect on legitimacy 
and democracy. Building on the work of theorists such as Rose-Ackemian, Diamond, and 
Morlino, Chapter 5 further explores corruption’s influence on civic attitudes, political 
behavior and expressions at the political level. Chapter 5 also documents and analyzes the 
endemic corruption that currently exists in Bosnia. Chapter 6 describes the field research, 
interview process, and findings. It attempts to identify where political loyalties and 
priorities truly lie and if the EU’s reform policies are aligned accordingly. Finally,
Chapter 7 provides a summary of this thesis and makes recommendations for further 
research.
CHAPTER 2
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF BOSNIA 
The Paradox of Dayton 
Thirteen years have passed since the signing of the General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina^ marked an end to the Bosnian war o f secession. It 
has also been nine years since the EU’s affirmation of the Security Pact for South Eastern 
Europe^ in the wake of the Kosovo conflict. Both of these protocols led to billions of 
dollars worth o f reconstruction funds, material, democratization efforts, humanitarian aid, 
and commitment to a revitalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future. Since 1995, 
almost every aspect o f Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economic and political development 
has been designed, supervised and monitored by a vast array of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and American and European experts. Tens of thousands of foreign 
diplomats, consultants, specialists, and missionaries have at one time or another 
descended on this small country of 4.5 million (CIA World Factbook, 2008).
In 1998 a Wall Street Journal article estimated that there were more than 50,000 
civilian workers in the country ( IFa// Street Journal, 1998). Hospitals, schools, electric 
transmission networks, power plants, transportation infrastructure, and a major airport 
have been reconstructed, not to mention the removal of thousands of anti-personnel
 ̂Commonly referred to as the “Dayton Peace Accords”.
 ̂The Stability Pact o f 1999 promised eventual candidate status to the states o f the 
western Balkans.
mines and unexploded ordinance left from the war. Today, Bosnia’s government 
continues to be overseen by the highly structured process of European Union assimilation 
and democratization known as the Stabilization and Association Process. Yet, despite this 
immense economic'^ and human achievement, widespread physical reconstruction, and 
the creation of democratic institutions, Bosnia's moribund consociational political system 
calls the country's viability into question. That such extensive investment in time and 
money has resulted in such little substantive political progress is a widely acknowledged 
paradox.
In a May 2008 speech to the Sarajevo based Circle 99 association,^ the US 
Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Charles English, characterized Bosnia as being 
"trapped in stagnation" (Embassy of the United States, 2008). On September 2008, the 
current High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Miroslav Lajcak, stated "I have seen 
the same atmosphere that I see today in Sarajevo-Banja Luka relations twice in my life. I 
saw it first in the Bratislava-Prague relations, and then in those between Podgorica and 
Belgrade, and we all know how that turned out”  ̂(Bosnian Insight, 2008). In his 2008 
report to the United Nations Security Council, Lajcak describes the domestic parties' 
conceptions of necessary refonu as "antithetical and non-negotiable" (UNSC, 2008).
Between 1995 and 2000, Europe had contributed over 2 billion euros toward 
assistance (European Assistance, 2000).
 ̂The Circle 99 group was founded in 1992, during the siege of Sarajevo, and 
originally comprised a small group of Sarajevo intellectuals, whose intention it was to 
elaborate on their intellectual resistance to aggression and nationalism. (Refer to 
http://www.krug99.ba/eng/99/krug/Onama.htm)
 ̂In this statement, Lajcak is referring to the secession of Montenegro from Serbia.
Widely reeognized indiees of government performanee further reveal the extent of the 
paradox. Bosnia ranks 54 out of 60 in the Foreign Poliey Failed State Index (2007). In the 
Index of Economie Freedom (2008), Bosnia is eategorized as ‘Mostly Unffee’ and ranked 
38 of 41 eountries in the European region, with an overall seore well below the regional 
average. Freedom House rankings improved after the war, but have only improved from 
5 to 4 sinee 1996. Bosnia as only ‘Partly Free’ in its Freedom in the World survey (2008). 
Transpareney International ranks Bosnia 84* in its Corruption Pereeptions Index (2007), 
with a rating o f 2.9, whieh plaees it generally above only undeveloped Afriean states. 
Furthermore, the High Representative eontinues to need his extensive exeeutive and 
legislative authority to leverage refonu. Aecording to the European Commission, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Progress Report (2007), between January 1, 2007 and September 30, 
2007, the High Representative used his exeeutive powers on 31 oecasions, whieh 
ineluded the foreed imposition o f legislation and the removal of officials. Organized 
erime and corruption are thriving (Anastasijevie, 2003). Citizens are dissatisfied with 
elected officials (Survey by the Center for Democraey and Reconciliation in Southeast 
Europe, 2004). Bosnia’s unemployment approaches 29 percent (Emerging Europe 
Monitor, 2008). Its public sector accounts for nearly 50 percent of GDP (International 
Monetary Fund, 2008) and approximately 20 percent o f the population lives in poverty 
(USAID, 2005). Analysts understand that, left to their own devices, many Bosnians 
would still “work to make the current internal lines of division permanent” (Soberg,
2006, p. 46). Moreover, Bosnia now finds itself last in line for European Union 
membership: behind Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, that 
is a failure made sharply ironic by the fact that, before the war, Yugoslavia was in many
ways “better poised than any other socialist country to make a successful transition to a 
market economy and to the West” (Woodward, 1995, p. 1).
The most widely accepted explanation for this remains ethnic nationalism, or one of 
its variants. Invariably, politicians and scholars point to the ethnic cleavages between 
Serbs, Croats and Muslims that caused the war. Three variants of this theme include, 
first, the depth of democracy that Dayton provides. Hayden (2005, p. 241), for example, 
views Bosnia’s constitution as flawed because it was instituted from above with no 
ratification by its constituent peoples, and that such a democracy is meaningless since the 
ethnic groups do not agree on its fundamental composition. A second variant blames 
Dayton’s consociational democracy because ethnic political elites have no common 
loyalty (Belloni, 2004, p. 173). Third, Woodward suggests that since it is a system based 
on ethnic rights, “it fails to resolve the core issues around which the war was fought” 
(1997, p. 30).
Dayton's Origin
The Dayton Peace Accords were initialed on November 21, 1995, and signed later 
that year in Paris on December 14. This peace protocol was the culmination of American- 
led negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, that ended a complex and costly four-year civil war in 
Bosnia, a republic of the former Yugoslavia. The struggle had killed 250,000 (Robinson 
and Pobric, 2005, p. 237), displaced more than two million (Robinson and Pobric, 2005, 
p.237), and caused 20 billion dollars in damage (World Bank, 1996). The framework 
stopped the killing and established a crude plan to transform Bosnia into a liberal 
democracy, essentially from scratch.
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According to Dayton’s terms, a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina would henceforth 
comprise three constituent peoples^ in two entities: the Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Croatians and Muslims would govern the Federation 
while Serbs would govern the Republic. Governance at all levels would employ an 
elaborate power-sharing scheme to ensure a balance o f ethnic power.
The US State Department authors began with a theoretical model conceived by 
political scientist Arend Lijphart, known as consociational democracy. The theory’s 
premise is that the mitigation o f divisive ethnic rivalries is possible when political elites 
share power within a government that recognizes these rivalries and incorporates this 
recognition into the political decision making processes. Over time, this ongoing 
cooperation, although initially disingenuous, will prevent violence and ultimately bring 
stability to divided societies. Consociational democracy relies on four principles o f power 
sharing: a so called grand coalition (instead o f a majority), veto power for each group, 
proportionality in the election system and civil service, and ethnic autonomy (Lijphart, 
1979). Consociational concepts were not new and had been used previously in the 
European Community system. Veto power, for example, is seen in the Luxembourg 
Compromise which provides that "Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by 
majority vote on a proposal o f the Commission, very important interests of one or more 
partners are at stake, the Members of the Council will endeavor, within a reasonable time, 
to reach solutions which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while
’ Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims.
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respecting their mutual interests and those of the Community". Taylor theorizes that the 
consociational approach works because elites will acquiesce to the expansion of 
supranational capacities in the hope of securing overflow gains for their own constituency 
(Taylor, 1994). In the case of Bosnia, to meet the power sharing principle, two semi- 
autonomous entities were created; the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,^ whose 
majority is Muslim-Croatian and occupies 51 percent of the country’s territory, and the 
Republika Srpska, whose majority is Serbian, and occupies the remaining 49 percent.
This division closely matched the population breakdown. A census taken in 1991 showed 
Bosnia’s population to be 44 percent Muslim, 33 percent Serb and 17 percent Croat 
(Hayden, 2005). An elaborate set of checks and balances were established to guarantee 
equal political representation, and institutions were structured according to the principle 
of ethnic proportionality and parity (Kasapovic, 2005). The final product provided a 
government with five tiers: State, Entity, Canton, Municipality, and City. A separate 
constitution is provided at each level. The government is intentionally weak at the top 
level, with power distributed downward in order to facilitate as much ethnic self-rule as 
possible.
None of the antagonists were satisfied with this final protocol. The Bosnian Serbs 
held that their representatives at Dayton had very little input into the treaty's content, so
Text of the Luxembourg Accords, from the Europa Glossary. 
URL:http://europa.eu/scadplus/ glossary/luxembourg compromise en.htm
 ̂The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina actually emerged from the 1994 Washington 
Agreement; it was primarily a military collaboration against the Serbs. It was here also 
that the 10 Cantons were first identified.
In 2001, the Bosnian Constitutional Court clarified that Serbs were a constituent 
etimic group within the Federation, and that Muslims and Croats were a constituent 
etiinic group within the Republika Srpska.
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they remained utterly opposed to the entire proeess. The Bosnian-Croat representative felt 
betrayed and resigned from offiee during the Dayton negotiations, and was not replaeed. 
Bosnian Muslims argued that allowing the ereation of the Republika Srpska entity 
rewarded Serb exeesses. In general, at Dayton no effort had been made to resolve the 
issues that started the war. It was as Alijia Izetbegovie deseribed, “an unjust peaee” {New 
York Times, 1993). Ethnie nationalism was elearly the primary souree of politieal 
instability and stalemate for the first deeade, or so, following Dayton. A multinational 
NATO foree" was neeessary for the eontinued eessation of hostilities. Responsibility for 
eivilian implementation of Dayton was assigned to a new offiee that would be ealled the 
High Representative, under the authority of a Peaee Implementation Couneil of 55 
member eountries. A variety of international institutions were also deeply involved.
These ineluded the United Nations Seeurity Couneil (UNSC), the Organization for 
Seeurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantie Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European 
Bank for Reeonstruetion and Development (EBRD).
At the time, Dayton was hailed by its authors as a great aeeomplishment. A long-term 
goal of its eontributors was demoeratization. As U.S. Seeretary o f State Warren 
Christopher remarked during the first initialing o f Dayton, “The agreement is a vietory 
for all of those who believe in a multi-ethnie demoeraey in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (New 
York Times, 1995). Annex III o f Dayton direets the OSCE to promote free, fair, and 
demoeratie eleetions and to lay the foundation for representative government and ensure 
the progressive aehievement of demoeratie goals throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
' ' Named IFOR -  short for "Implementation Foree".
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Article I of Bosnia’s State constitution reads, “Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a 
democratic state, whieh shall operate under the rule of law and with free and demoeratie 
eleetions.” The G-7 Summit Chairman's Statement reads, “We eonfirm our support for 
the Peaee Agreement and the establishment of a demoeratie and pluralistie State of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed of two Entities” (Lyons Summit Doeuments, 1996).
There was cautious optimism that external intervention would be needed for only a 
short period of time. In September 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher was 
confident enough to eomment that “the United States would now be able to withdraw its 
peacekeeping troops from Bosnia by the end of the year as President Clinton promised” 
{New York Times, 1996). In principle, its democratically elected leaders were to pursue 
the objectives prescribed by Dayton with minimal external intervention. However, it was 
immediately clear that this would not prove to be the case. In a classic example of what 
Schmitter and Karl (1991) term the “fallacy of electoralism”, it was obvious that the 
newly elected govermnent would be unable to funetion when ultra-nationalists Muslim 
Alija Izetbegovie, Serb Momcilo Krajisnik, and Croat Kresimir Zubak were voted into 
power. These were the same individuals that only months beforehand were orchestrating 
the war. The Peace Implementation Council responded by exereising new expanded 
powers through its High Representative and unilaterally enaeting reform. By early 1997, 
the Dayton “voluntary” democratization and stabilization plan had mutated into a system 
that would be “force-fed” to Bosnians from the outside.
14
Kosovo
In 1998, two years after Dayton, the disintegration of Yugoslavia restarted. Ethnic 
fighting broke out in the Kosovo region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Hostilities arose between Serbian military and police forces, and secessionist ethnic 
Albanians. The international community became alarmed when panic drove nearly one 
million ethnic Albanian refugees into neigliboring countries (International Monetary 
Fund, 1999). There was fear that hostilities would spread into neighboring countries with 
large ethnic Albanian minority populations, such as Macedonia and Montenegro. 
Although both sides were to blame for the conflict, Serbian forces were found to be using 
excessively brutal tactics against civilians (King and Mason, 2006, pp. 43-45). When 
attempted negotiations with Belgrade failed,'^ it was decided that the most expedient 
solution was to use military force against Serbia. After a seventy-seven day NATO air 
campaign, Serbian forces departed from the Kosovo region. The UN Security Council 
subsequently deployed a long-term civil and security presence in Kosovo, under United 
Nations oversight. As with the war in Bosnia, regional economic, humanitarian and social 
costs of this war were staggering. Economic damage to Serbia alone was estimated at 
roughly $30 billion (Group-17 Report, 1999).
A New Security Paradigm in the Balkans 
When the Bosnian war began in 1992, there was little Western interest in committing 
military assistance beyond providing humanitarian support. Warren Christopher, 
commented that the United States “had no vital interests in Bosnia” {New York Times,
12 The negotiations are known as the Rambouillet Accords.
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1993). This hesitation by the US to intervene occurred for several reasons. Soviet 
domination of Eastern Europe had only recently ended, so there was no revised policy to 
confront the new types of emerging regional security issues. For forty years the West had 
followed a policy of non-intervention in the Balkans. Also, there was significant in­
fighting between America, France and Germany over which force should manage an 
intervention, if  there was to be one (i.e. the United Nations, NATO or a regional security 
force led by the European Community, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe or the Western European Union). Russia was also exerting pressure on the US to 
not take action against Serbia. Broadly speaking, these factors resulted in an overall lack 
of commitment by the United States and Europe that undermined effective peace-keeping 
and umiecessarily prolonged the Bosnian war until Dayton in 1995 (Gow, 1997, p. 299).
A similar critical observation can be made regarding the war in Kosovo. American 
and European policies were not designed for the events that unfolded after the fall of 
communism. Once again. Western response to the growing crisis in Serbia did not 
prevent a second war. It took this second humanitarian and security crisis to finally 
“bring international attention back to this part of Europe” (Biermann, 1999, p.5). The 
Euro-Atlantic community finally realized it had to accept that Europe, as a whole, had a 
stake in the Balkans. Policies developed to manage the traditional interstate rivalries 
between major military powers no longer functioned because these were no longer the 
primary threats to regional peace. The international security paradigm had changed. The 
tlireat in this region had shifted to the dangers of fragmentation in states that were more 
peripheral (Chandler, 2000, p. 22). Moreover, the concept of “security threat” now began 
to encompass not only violence, but advanced technological systems, hard drugs.
16
HIV/AIDS, the permeability of state borders, transnational refugee flows, economic 
migrations, and the role of diasporas (Del Sarto, 2006, p. 508).
The Stabilization Pact for Southeastern Europe 
Following Dayton, US and European policy toward Bosnia was based on the 
assumption that the benefits of closer trade ties with the EU would prove a more enticing 
goal than continued nationalism. There was only an indetenninate prospect of EU 
membership for Bosnia. Incentives during this early period were vague, and failed to 
motivate elites to follow a path of democratization and reform on their own. By 1999, 
political reforms vis-à-vis Dayton had lost traction. It was only after the war in Kosovo, 
that both the EU and the United States fully realized their earlier policy weaknesses. One 
result of this revelation was a fundamental policy shift in Europe's approach to security in 
the Balkan region. Brussels realized that the American “policy o f emergency 
reconstruction, containment and stabilization was not, in itself, enough to bring lasting 
peace and stability to the area; only the real prospect o f integration into democratic 
European structures would achieve that” (European Commission Report, 2002, p. 4). 
Against the backdrop of a second bloody entanglement in the region, a new strategy took 
form in the Stabilization Pact for South Eastern E u r o p e a n d  the EU’s Stabilization and 
Association Process. From this point forward, Dayton took a back seat to the EU, which 
then took the lead in administering Bosnia and preparing it for integration into EU 
structures.
The Security Pact is now managed by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
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A new foeus was placed on addressing “Europe’s stratégie shortfalls” (Stability Paet, 
Seetion 1) of the past. In the Stability Paet, the EU reaffirmed its resolve to assume 
responsibility for western Balkan stability, this time by offering to direet the eountries 
toward what Chandler (2006, p. 35) terms “the pot of gold that was held to eome with EU 
membership”. Europe would aeeomplish this by making a eommitment to the western 
Balkan eount r i es for  an unambiguous and potentially aecelerated path to European 
Union membership. Within one year, the countries were recognized as “potential 
eandidates” for EU membership. In return for this commitment, the western Balkan 
eountries agreed to eooperate with the terms of the Paet. Heneeforth, integration with the 
European Union was eonsidered a non-negotiable prerequisite for regional seeurity. The 
hub of the Pact was the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), and a new category 
of Stabilization and Assoeiation Agreement (SAA) that would be adapted to the needs of 
each country. The SAA resembles the Europe Agreements coneluded with the countries 
of central and eastern Europe.
Bosnia’s SAP involves multiple steps that include fulfillment o f the requirements of 
the EU Roadmap,'^ completion of the action items of the European Commission 
Feasibility S t u d y , a n d  completion of subsequent SAA negotiations. Once the SAA is 
signed, its terms must then be implemented in order for Bosnia to be deemed a
The Western Balkan countries were Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Former
Yugoslav Republie o f Macedonia, and the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia.
In 2000, an EU "Road Map" identified eighteen steps to be taken by Bosnia prior to 
preparation of the Feasibility Study for SAA negotiations.
In November 2003, the Commission i 
preparedness of Bosnia to negotiate a SAA.
presented the Feasibility Study on the
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“candidate” for EU membership. After candidate status is acquired, the European Council 
begins accession negotiations. These negotiations result in an Accession Agreement, 
which requires European Parliament consent and unanimous European Council 
agreement for final membership ratification. The EU policy mechanism linking this wide 
range of political and economic reform with progressively closer bilateral EU relations is 
commonly termed “conditionality”. “Conditionality” relies on rewards and penalties 
which are contingent upon the fulfillment o f certain political reforms such as those found 
in the “Copenhagen Criteria” '^ and the Acquis Communitaire.’* Individual steps through 
the process are administered through what is termed a European Partnership. The most 
recent progress milestone for Bosnia was completed when the European Council 
authorized the European Commission to open official SAA negotiations on November 
25, 2005. In December 2007, the last remaining prerequisite for SAA initiation, namely 
the replacement o f independent entity police forces with a single state force, was 
tentatively met. It is anticipated that the SAA will be formally concluded in 2008.
Europe’s “conditionality” approach has been to compel Bosnia, through financial 
assistance programs, trade privileges, peer pressure, and the authority of the High 
Representative, to implement constitutional and legislative reforms that shift political 
power from the entity to the state level and to create state level institutions that facilitate 
an EU interface (Chandler, 2006, p. 36). As noted, these reforms have been primarily
The Copenhagen European Council, held in 1993, delineated the conditions for 
European Union membership, which are now commonly known as the "Copenhagen 
Criteria".
The Acquis Communitaire is the complete body o f common rights and obligations 
that is binding on all the Member States of the European Union, 
http ://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ glossary/terms/acquis_en.htm
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institutional in nature. They address refugee and displaced person returns, police re­
organization at the state level, creation o f an impartial public media broadcasting sector, 
administrative capacity building in the area of customs and taxation, cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), creating a single 
economic space, and the labor market. The EU has chosen to address corruption only 
indirectly. The development and implementation of reform addressing the control of 
coiTuption has, for the most part, been left in the hands o f the Bosnians themselves. 
Though some action has been taken, it has been mostly superficial. For example, the UN 
Convention on Fighting Corruption was recently ratified, and a National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy and action plan was established in 2006. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
implementation of these programs has been unsatisfactory. The 2007 and 2008 Bosnia- 




DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY 
Pervasive corruption, as found in Bosnia, undemiines public faith in elected 
government and the democratic system itself. For this reason, an understanding of the 
prerequisites for legitimacy and democracy are essential. Scholars view these two 
concepts from many perspectives. They are neither absolute nor unchanging. They 
continue to be influenced by contemporary and historical events, social conditions, and 
research methodologies. Viewpoints developed in different eras often differ. 
Contradictions emerge as time proves earlier assumptions wrong. The rights of citizens as 
conceived by Jeremy Bentham, for instance, are not considered democratic by today’s 
standards. Moreover, controversies between authors often arise since the quality o f any 
democracy is a value-laden subject (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. ix). Consequently, a 
very large body o f work is available for study.
This chapter presents a small selection of this literature relevant to concepts presented 
herein. Lipset’s (1959, pp. 71-72) definition o f democracy serves as a suitable starting 
point. Lipset wrote; “Democracy is a political system which supplies regular 
constitutional opportunities for changing governing officials. It is a social mechanism for 
the resolution o f the problem of societal decision making among conflicting interest 
groups which pennits the largest possible part o f the population to influence these 
decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political
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office.” At the core o f Lipset’s definition are three simple dimensions: competition, 
participation, and liberty. Yet, as plainspoken as this definition may appear, its true 
meaning raises a number o f complex issues.
Democracy
This complexity, the idea of “rule by the people”, has been has a source of heated 
debate for centuries. In his Republic, Plato criticized democracy, arguing that states 
should be ruled by philosopher-kings. Less than one hundred years later, Aristotle, in The 
Politics, suggested that the rule of the many was the best governance system 
(Morgenthau, 2004, p.67). In his Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli hinted at democratic 
principles when he discussed the value o f dissension between plebeian and noble 
factions. The period from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century saw the emergence of 
classical republicanism that rebelled against institutions claiming divine justification. The 
sovereignty o f the monarch was replaced with the sovereignty o f the people. Such liberal 
reasoning brought new democratic parliaments to England and Scotland. English political 
culture at this juncture, however, did not encourage public input. There were no 
opposition parties or public space in which political factions could openly compete and 
exchange ideas (Zaret, 2000, p. 7). Secrecy, censorship, and privilege remained the norm 
(Zaret, 2000, p. 8). The democracy debate expanded with philosophers such as Locke, 
Mill, Rousseau and Kant who re-introduced the concept o f socioeconomic inequality. In 
the nineteenth century a Marxist school o f thought emerged arguing that to achieve full 
freedom capitalism should be replaced with communism. More recent contributions
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include theses by Lipset and Dahl, who argue that modernization and economic strength 
are correlatives to democracy.
Many academics today frame their study of democracy chronologically and 
theoretically in relation to what Samuel Huntington (1991) termed, three “waves” of 
democratization. Huntington observed that the spread of democracy was advancing and 
receding cyclically over time. The first wave, spanning the years from 1828 to 1926, 
comprised the United States since the presidency o f Andrew Jackson, the democratization 
of Western Europe and colonies in Australia, Chile and Canada, and the democratization 
of Eastern and Central Europe post-1918. This was followed by a reverse wave that 
lasted from 1922 to 1942 and brought National Socialism to Germany, Fascism to Italy 
and the spread of the Third Reich. The second wave occurred between 1943 and 1962 
and accounts for tbe democratization of West Germany, Italy, Austria, South Korea and 
Japan under occupation during and after World War Two. It also incorporates 
democratization following decolonization of India, Nigeria, Israel, Philippines and 
Jamaica. This second wave is overlapped by another reverse wave that lasted from 1958 
to 1975 and brought military regimes to much of the third world of that period. The third 
wave began in 1974 and brought the fall of communism in Europe, and the 
democratization of Spain, Greece and Portugal, and much of Latin America, Asia and 
Africa.
As more countries embraced and rejected democracy, researchers encountered an 
increasing number o f complexities and contradictions. Collier and Levitsky (1997, p.
430), for example, identified references to hundreds of democracy subtypes that differed 
“profoundly both from each other and from the democracies in advanced industrial
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countries”. Authors shifted their attention from the sources o f transition to democracy 
and looked toward the factors that sustained it (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. ix). The 
early theory of “modernization” was first seen as responsible for the success or failure of 
a democracy (Evans and Whitefield, 1995, p. 485). Additional theories began to 
encompass structural, economic, social, and cultural dimensions in addition to the narrow 
institutional views of scholars such as Joseph Schumpeter (Sorensen, 1998, p. 9). 
Concepts such as “democratic consolidation” and what Saxonberg and Linde (2003) term 
“transitology” emerged to capture the broad process o f sustaining and solidifying 
democratic regimes.
The theory of the "democratic peace" gained significant attention in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Empirical research has demonstrated that democratic states are 
generally as conflict and war prone as non-democracies; and yet over the last two 
centuries, they have rarely gone to war with one another (Moaz and Russett, 1993, p.l).
Legitimacy
The heart of democracy is “legitimation” according to Larry Diamond (1999, p. 65). 
“Legitimation” refers to the process o f reaching the end product that democracy is 
expected to produce. It is the degree o f fulfillment of this expectation. Legitimacy is a 
measure o f the effectiveness of a govermnent system in terms of meeting public 
expectation. Effectiveness in this context means: public endorsement of the political 
mechanism and its ability to sustain balanced public decision making. In its ideal form, a 
legitimate political regime exists when its citizens unconditionally submit to its rules and 
procedures. This procedural order becomes the only horizon within which political actors
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act (Schmitter and Guilhot, 2000, p. 132). A characteristic of democracy is that its 
existence depends on legitimacy. The general consensus among academics is that there is 
no universal formula for legitimacy. Each country must be evaluated within the bounds of 
its own circumstances (Sorensen, 1998, p. 16).
Among the many legitimacy variables proposed are economic and social conditions, 
beliefs and psychological attitudes, a capacity for empathy, the idea of civic culture, 
social structures, and political structures (Rustow, 1970, pp. 351-352). Research o f Asian 
countries performed by Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri and Tessler (2008) suggests that 
political indicators such as trust in institutions and a fair electoral system have the most 
influence on legitimacy, although economic factors should not be completely dismissed. 
Citizens of new democracies are able to discern political from economic elements of 
regime performance. Here, legitimacy hinges on whether political institutions command 
public trust. Rose, Mishler and Haef (1998) encountered similar results in their study of 
former East Block countries when they found that political factors mattered more than 
economic factors in determining support for democracy. David Becker (1999) points out 
that for new democracies, in the short term, legitimacy also includes fulfilling the 
expectations o f those societal strata and interest groups that supported the previous 
regime and still wield sufficient influence to hinder democratization. As an example, he 
refers specifically to small but influential military, business sector and political elite 
elements in Chile, Brazil, and Peru. Along these lines, Chang, Chu and Park (2007, p. 68) 
add that robust legitimacy ultimately requires citizens to profess “authoritarian 
detachment”, that is they must eventually reject non-democratic alternatives if for no 
other reason than there are no preferable alternatives.
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In his study o f failing democracies in Latin America, O’Domiell (2004, p. 10) 
attributed a lack of legitimacy to high levels o f social inequality, which he believed 
undermined the basic premise of democracy, namely individual agency. Human agency 
he reasoned is the grounding factor of democracy. According to O’Donnell, human 
agency is not a privilege or a goal -  it is a right of all human beings. It is the highest 
moral right, and is the foundation of political life. He defines a human agent as “someone 
normally endowed with sufficient autonomy for deciding what kind of life is to be led, 
has the cognitive ability to reasonably detect options available, and is responsible for the 
courses o f action ultimately taken”. Within the context o f democracy, human agency can 
be conceptualized as the potential o f group decision making through fair and 
institutionalized elections that are bound within the laws o f the state. From this aggregate 
perspective, agency is both a participatory right and a responsibility imposed on citizens 
by the state. The state is thus presupposed to be both a territorial delimitation and a legal 
system (O’Donnell, 2004, p. 16).
O’Donnell’s concept of human agency logically leads to questions o f what are the 
capabilities and range of options available to the human agent and which conditions 
enable or hinder an individual to function as an agent. In other words, what are the 
reasonable bounds o f legitimacy? The answer lies in the origins o f civil law, for example 
in the area o f contract and social welfare, both of which rest on a basic criterion of 
fairness; fairness being a corollary o f agency. O’Donnell’s line of reasoning is that the 
state, as a legal system, ensures fairness by guaranteeing that humans are able to interact 
with one another as equivalent agents without coercive influences on their agency, or 
their range of choices. It accomplishes this by providing necessary freedoms such as
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expression, association, and access to information. Human agency thus equates to 
political citizenship legally enacted and backed. Moreover, to ensure fairness, there can 
be no individual or institution that is legibus solutus, that is, above the law (O’Donnell, 
2004, p. 33). O ’Donnell summarizes by arguing that citizens exercise their human agency 
through voting in fair elections. In doing so, they express their support for democracy’s 
rules and procedures. Consequently, “it is these voting citizens who are the very source 
and justification o f the authority needed to rule states and governments”. Democracy thus 
logically precludes citizens from being treated as “subjects” or “supplicants of the 
goodwill of the state” (O’Donnell, 2004, p. 34).
Schmitter and Guilhot (2000, pp. 132-133) explain that for a democratic regime to 
persist, rules and procedures must be put in place that facilitate the eligibility o f citizens 
to participate in political decision making processes. These rules and procedures must 
also chamiel the conduct of relevant actors. They must be seen as appropriate and 
employed on a normal basis either because they are normative or because non- 
compliance involves higher costs than compliance. A democratic transition comprises 
more than procedural attributes. It is an “actor-centered” process. In a similar line of 
reasoning, Darren Hicks (2002, p. 225) suggests that the legitimacy o f a democratic 
system rests on its commitment to public justification. That is, social and political 
policies should be justified by reasons that can be accepted by all those affected. He 
places the locus o f justification on stakeholders themselves through the mechanisms of 
representation and participation in civil society. Hicks (2002, p. 225) cites empirical 
evidence that stakeholders who are able to participate in “collaborative processes” will 
endorse decisions even at the cost of their own interests. The term “collaborative
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processes”, in this context, refers to collective reasoning by citizens as moral and political 
equals.
The concept o f legitimacy can be said to be embodied in the principle of 
“accountability”. By “accountability” Cullell (2005, p. 143) refers to the obligation of 
elected officials to justify their decisions to citizens and the consequences o f this 
justification. When working properly, accountability is a strong incentive for politicians 
to be responsive to citizens. Accountability has two aspects: vertical and horizontal. 
Vertical accountability refers to the tension that develops between electoral actors 
(primarily citizens) and elected officials as a result of political performance. It is most 
frequently operationalized at election time when citizens either reward pleasing 
perforaiance with reelection or punish displeasing performance by voting for alternate 
candidates. Vertical accountability is also employed between elections when institutions 
such as non-government organizations, social movements, and the media publicly hold 
officials accountable for their decisions (Schmitter, 2005, p. 23). For the mechanics of 
vertical accountability to function, bona fide elections offering reasonable alternatives to 
voters must be held (Diamond and Morlino, 2005 p. xix). Horizontal accountability refers 
to the relationship that exists between elected officials and bodies such as counter­
corruption agencies, the court system, and enforcement agencies that have authority to 
independently scrutinize and circumscribe the power of these officials. Diamond and 
Morlino (2005, p. xxi) note that counter-corruption commissions are crucial for 
contemporary democracies and emphasize that that they must possess sufficient power, 
breadth and resources to execute credible and interlocking investigations, deter 
temptation and try suspected offenders free from government interference.
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Based on the theories presented, for a democratic regime to be legitimate the 
mechanics o f vertical and horizontal accountability must be operational. This leads to the 
next discussion of this chapter, namely the rule of law. Legitimacy in the form of vertical 
and horizontal accountability must be enforced, hence the need for laws. For example, 
voters and institutions demanding vertical punishment of officials must be legally 
protected from intimidation and retribution. Agencies need the authority and functional 
legislation to aggressively prosecute law-breaking officials. But the rule of law is more 
than a collection of legally enforceable rules to protect voters. The rule of law in a 
democracy is typically established in a document, such as a constitution, that represents 
the highest law of the land. Constitutions also establish the unit o f the polity, the citizen 
(Becker, 1999, p. 141). Laws emanating from a democratic constitution apply universally 
to all citizens. Thus, in addition to legislation, within a democracy the rule of law implies 
democratic behavior within an institutionalized system of impartial rights both coveted 
by citizens and respected in others. Moreover, this interplay o f rights motivates rational 
individuals to circumscribe the rule-breaking o f other individuals. In this way, each 
citizen has a stake in formulating and enforcing societal norms. In Europe this concept is 
commonly termed “rechsstaat” or “constitutional state” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 64). As noted 
above, it is from this principle of universal and impartial rights that we derive the concept 
that there can be no individual or institution that is legibus solutus, that is, above the law.
Legitimacy works much like a quality assurance standard that allows us to measure 
the effectiveness of a democratic system. It establishes the bounds of acceptable political 
behavior by those in power and also behavior of the governed. The following paraphrase 
of Lipset summarizes the concept of political legitimacy: for a government to be
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legitimized those out of power must adhere to decisions made by those in power, while 
those in power must respect the rights of those out of power (Lipset, S. M. 1959). By this 
he meant that democracy relies on a reciprocal balance of power and responsibility 
between the governed and the governors. It is thus reasonable to state that democracy and 
legitimacy are mutually correlative.
In the case of Bosnia, little democracy-oriented survey data is available for study. 
However, the insight gleaned from what is available corroborates the findings of this 
thesis: namely widespread corruption and a poor opinion toward government 
performance. According to the Early Warning System of the United Nations 
Development Program, public opinion surveys find that citizens still exhibit an obvious 
reserve toward state authorities, and public support for all levels o f government is 
consistently below 60 percent among citizens o f all three ethnic groups (United Nations 
Development Program, 2004). In a 2004 public opinion survey performed by the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Bosnia, 80 percent of 
respondents responded that they could have no influence on what political parties and 
politicians would talk about during the pre-election campaign and upcoming 2006 
elections. A 2006 Open Society Fund Democracy Assessment in Bosnia found that 77 
percent o f respondents thought the rule o f law operative at a very low or low level 
throughout the country, 63 percent thought that public officials did not perform their 
duties in accordance with transparency laws, 79 percent believed that confidence in the 
country’s legal system was low or very low, 69 percent thought that the business sector 
was insufficiently regulated in the public interest, 94 percent o f respondents said public 
confidence in the effectiveness o f government and leadership was low or very low, 57
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percent believed there is significant influence of paramilitary units, private amiies, 
warlordism and criminal mafias on the country, 90 percent said the effectiveness of the 
separation o f public office from party advantage and the personal interests o f office 
holders was low or very low, 86 percent believed that officials, companies and public 
services were involved in corruption, 84 percent thought the extent o f citizen 
participation in voluntary and self-management organizations was low or very low, 71 
percent thought the access o f all social groups to public office and their representation in 
the public life were insufficient; and 81 percent thought the accessibility o f elected 
representatives to their constituents was low or very low (Open Society Fund, 2006).
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CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL ATTITUDE AND ALIENATION 
This thesis posits that the influence of corruption and poor govenunent performance 
are causing political attitude to be transformed in Bosnia. Political attitude studies are a 
subset of both public opinion studies and political psychology. The quantification and 
operationalization of political attitude are often referred to as “political efficacy”. The 
study of political attitude involves investigating factors that influence political choice. 
Political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists have each approached this research 
from different perspectives and have produced a large body o f literature describing these 
influences. Accordingly, this chapter examines political attitude for multiple reasons. 
First, this thesis holds that if  the political attitude o f Bosnian middle class is being 
influenced by deeply entrenched corruption, there will be a negative impact on 
democratization. Second, an affirmative political attitude or a certain level o f efficacy 
across a population generally, is necessary (though not sufficient) for political legitimacy. 
It is widely seen as a correlative to the stability and development of political systems 
(Chung-Li, 2003, p. 729). Third, political attitude, as expressed through opinions, is a 
reasonable standard by which govenunent perfonnance can be measured. Public attitude 
can also tell us what criteria citizens use to gauge govenunent perfonnance. Last, mass 
political attitude possesses a dynamic that can influence political systems. Acquiring and 
sustaining political power depends, in part, on the ability to influence public attitude and
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thus provide votes. Political opinion thus has the potential to influence legitimacy and 
therefore democracy. Both Allport’s definition of political attitude and Stewart’s 
definition of political efficacy serve as appropriate guides for this chapter. Political 
attitude refers to “action or readiness for action with regard to a given issue on the part of 
members of a public who are reacting in the expectation that others in the public are 
similarly oriented toward the same issue” (Allport, 1936, p. 92). Political efficacy is the 
dichotomous perception that “one has the necessary resources and skills to affect the 
political process, and that this process responds to efforts to exert influence” (Stewart, 
1992, p. 180).
Political Attitude
Political attitude is a transitory social phenomenon that aggregates individual 
preferences and choices (Davison, 1958, p. 92). It is a combination of emotional reactions 
to the media, and interactions between individuals, real or imagined. It is reciprocal in 
that it simultaneously reflects and influences the opinions o f a population. Welzel 
observes that political attitude has a bonding effect on both individuals and members of 
society. It consolidates social capital and allows individuals to “translate democratic 
preferences into active support for democratic goals” (Welzel, 2007, p. 339). He suggests 
tlxree normative types of public attitude necessary for democracy (Welzel, 2007, p. 400). 
First, there must be a widespread preference for democracy. Second, there must be wide- 
ranging communal attitudes. Third, broad emancipative attitudes are necessary because 
the idea of people power is an implicit concept of democracy. Muller and Seligson (1994, 
p. 647) contribute interpersonal trust as a product o f democracy. Inglchart and Welzel,
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(2005, p. 137) add self-expression values as one more mass attitude conducive to 
democracy. Linz and Stephan (1996, p. 8) frame democratic legitimacy as a political 
opinion.
Attitude Formation and Political Decision Making
Ideally, individuals would all make rational political decisions, in the sense that 
thought would be unaffected by emotions or desires. It means the type o f political 
thinking that everyone would exercise if our best interests were really known (Baron, 
2000, p. 5). Clearly, this condition is far from reality. Social psychologists examine the 
flaws in people’s reasoning when they make decisions, fonu beliefs and choose goals, in 
areas o f life, such as politics. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), for example, proposed what 
they termed prospect theory to explain how the descriptive framing of risk causes people 
to draw different conclusions for the same problem. They discovered that many 
individuals, although they think they are acting in their own best interest, are in fact 
doing the opposite.
Political scientist Peter Marris (2001, pp. 280-281) views belief formation as the 
product of a contest between substantive and political rationality. Substantive arguments 
are those derived from rational enquiry, a notion sometimes referred to as deliberative 
democracy, while political rationality is based upon greed, prejudice and self-interest. 
Marris argues that political rationality dominates the political world because rational 
procedures o f discovery are not adaptable to public debate. Still, substantive rationality 
can occasionally influence public opinion. As an example, he notes how public awareness 
of global warming has changed public perceptions o f the environment (Marris, 2001, p.
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281). Chung-Li (1994) hypothesizes that political attitude is dependent upon socio­
economic status and subjective cognition o f politics. In his study o f a New Orleans, 
Louisiana mayoral election, social background conditions, notably race, were the key 
explanatory variables for political orientation. Harris (1991) posits that religion can act as 
a resource for political mobilization. In his study o f political participation among church- 
going African Americans in Chicago, Illinois, he found that religious beliefs and 
practices facilitate psychological resources for individual and collective political action.
Building on Noelle-Neumaim’s (1993) spiral o f silence theory, which holds that fear 
of social isolation is the compelling force behind aggregate changes in public opinion, 
Scheufele and Eveland (2001) posit that the distribution o f public opinions in a 
population influences individual political participatory behavior. The spiral o f silence 
theory holds that individuals continually scan public opinion on controversial issues and 
tend to remain silent about their own political opinions when they perceive themselves to 
be in the minority. In the long run, this creates the impression that the majority opinion is 
stronger than it really is. Scheufele and Eveland pursued this line o f reasoning in their 
research, and found that public opinion perceptions, group membership, media use, and 
interpersonal discussion do influence political participation for some subgroups of 
society. In their investigation o f Canadian federalism and political efficacy, Stewart, 
Komberg, and Acock (1992) found that institutional contexts o f its federal system 
affected Canadian political attitude, as reflected in different levels o f external and internal 
efficacy structured along federal and provincial dimensions.
Sociologists Sutherland and Tanenbaum (1984) suggest that individual political 
preferences are strongly related to rational views about how society functions. They find
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political preferences strongly linked with ideologies o f what is possible to accomplish in 
society. Miller and Krosnick (2004) identified the level o f political participation changes 
when individuals or groups are confronted with and seek to avert political threat that may 
affect material s e lf  interest or well being. In a condition not unlike Olsen’s free-rider 
syndrome, Latane (1981) argues that individuals may decrease their political participation 
when they believe they belong to a group with a similar political agenda. In her attempt 
to validate claims that crowded ghetto living was instrumental in starting civil disorders, 
Susan Welch (1976) found that physical crowding of people showed effects on political 
aggression, especially under conditions where negative attitude toward government were 
preexisting.
Political Alienation
A consequence of poor political attitude, or low political efficacy, is that individuals 
become estranged from their government. Political alienation is a construct used by many 
sociologists and political scientists to describe this variant o f political behavior. There is a 
long tradition in its study. Theorists in the Marxist tradition, for example, hold that 
political alienation is created when institutions and politicians extract power from citizens 
and subsequently reassert that power in the fomi o f policies having a negative impact on 
those from whom power was derived in the first place (Seeman, 1959, p.783). Emile 
Durkheim’s (1912) Elementary Fonns o f  Religious Life is another early essay on 
alienation (Gabel, 1984, p. 179). For the purposes of this study we define political 
alienation as a type o f individual or group attitude that results from a perception of poor 
govermuent perfonnance combined with low levels o f political efficacy.
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From the term alienation, a broad meaning can be inferred. Alienation implies an 
ideal standard of attitude or level of efficacy, an individual ought to possess, and that this 
level does not exist in the alienated. Finifter (1970, p. 64) distinguishes four 
manifestations of political alienation. First, individuals may have a feeling o f political 
powerlessness, in which the actions of the government are not subject to their influence. 
Second, there can be a perception of political meaninglessness. In this case, individuals 
detect no recognizable predictability in decisions and policies. Consequently government 
decisions are seen as in ational and unusable. Thirdly, citizens sense a departure from 
established political norms, for instance when politicians violate the law in the course of 
their duties. Fourth, there can be a feeling o f “political isolation” wbere an individual 
believes existing political practices are unfair, illegitimate, or fraudulent. Seeman (1959, 
p.789) provides a fifth variant - self estrangement. Here, an individual can become 
estranged from a normal human condition, for instance loss of pride in work.
Weatherford (1991, p. 150) suggests that the legitimacy-attitude nexus exists at two 
dimensions: individual and macro. At the macro level, legitimacy is said to exist if 
constitutional guarantees of representation and system stability exist. Popular support is 
not in the equation. At this level, legitimacy is not defined by popularity but by bow well 
officials act in the polity’s best interest. At the individual level, he posits personal 
feelings of alienation as a factor. Individuals manifest two types o f alienation: input 
alienation, which is recognizable by symptoms of diminished political and citizen 
involvement, and output alienation, which results in suspicion and cynicism. Converse 
(1972) attributes group alienation to increased levels of education. Education increases 
people’s political awareness. It is often accompanied by a shift toward more liberal
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viewpoints and thus a demand for government to solve social problems. When this does 
not occur as expected, people become alienated.
Theorists generally propose one of three broad effects of political alienation: either 
reduction in political participation, participation in constructive radicalism, or anti­
democratic radicalism. Certain voting behavior or massive protests may be employed to 
demonstrate disapproval with government policy or poor social conditions. Macke (1979, 
p. 77) contends that alienation at the individual level is not necessarily a determinant of 
matching group-level response. In his study o f political alienation in the United States, 
Templeton (1966) found that political alienation was a predictable cause o f withdrawal 
from political participation. Alienated citizens may become disinterested in political 
parties or refuse to vote. Macke (1979, p. 78) finds it a correlative of social discontent 
and perceived economic conditions. She also found that, during periods of high 
alienation, voters do not necessarily “redress their grievances by voting incumbents out 
of office”, but rather are more likely to “use more indirect pressures” Macke (1979, p. 
87).
Some theorists hold that alienation can result in anti-democratic modes o f political 
behavior. Gusfeld (1962, p. 21) argues that groups that become disconnected from social 
structures and norms are capable o f extremist political behavior. In an examination of 
American radical right ideology, Abcarian and Stanage (1967, p.788 and p.792) found 
alienation a source o f political activism and charismatic identification. In a similar study, 
Powell (1986, p. 371) found the strength of extremist parties a barometer of political 
alienation. Similarly, Muller, Jukam, and Seligson (1982, p. 257) argue that an extreme 
form of alienation can be an incentive for various forms o f politically aggressive
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behavior. Sallach, Babchuk and Booth (1972, p. 891), in their study o f alienation, found 
that the powerless are very likely to depart from normal participation, namely voting, and 
join in extremist behavior. There also is evidence that the alienated can be drawn to the 
polls by an extremist demagogue. Mason and Jaros (1969, pp. 495-496) present evidence 
demonstrating that, under certain circumstances, the alienated are more likely to support 
extreme, politically disruptive candidates.
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CHAPTER 5
CORRUPTION AND LEGITIMACY 
The previous chapter established a link between democracy, public opinion and 
legitimacy. In this next chapter, the linkage is examined in more detail. Because the 
corruption-legitimacy link in Bosnia forms the basis of this thesis, the specific impacts of 
corruption on political attitude and legitimacy are now explored. This chapter begins by 
describing how perceptions of corruption have evolved over time and provides a review 
of relevant literature and a discussion of how these effects are expressed through public 
attitude. It then follows with a detailed profile of Bosnia’s modem corruption record. The 
following simple definition of corruption by Robert Klitgaard (1998, p. xi) is provided as 
a point of departure: “Corruption exists when an individual illicitly puts personal interests 
above those of the people he or she is pledged to serve.”
Perceptions o f Corruption 
Corruption is a topic of contradictions. It is very difficult to define precisely, and can 
be viewed from both a moral and legal perspective. It is often agreed to be a conditional 
concept, yet it has rarely been viewed as ideal behavior. Historically, it has never been 
the policy of Western civilization to encourage corruption as an open and elemental part 
in its society or economy. In the history o f Western thought, the wrongness of corruption 
is more widely agreed upon than any other tenet of good governance (Meyer, 1975, p.
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62). As early as 1300 BC we find laws forbidding it. An edict o f Pharaoh Horemheb 
proclaimed that any judge accepting a reward from a litigant while failing to hear the 
defendant was guilty of a crime against justice and subject to capital punishment (Martin, 
1999). In the sixth century BC, Athenian law prohibited bribery. “If any Athenian 
accepts a bribe, or himself offers one to another or corrupts anyone with promises to the 
detriment of the people or o f any of the citizens individually, by any means or device, 
himself and his children and his property will be confiscated” (Demosthenes XXI). Plato 
forbids corruption in The Laws. Under the Roman Twelve Tables, a judge convicted of 
bribery would suffer capital punishment (Peck, 2007). A later Roman law known as the 
Lex Julia de Repetundis required that a judge convicted of bribery suffer expulsion from 
the senatorial order or exile (Plescia, 2001).
Corruption is also viewed as destructive by the three great revealed religions. Islam 
teaches that bribes are not permissible. Mohammed “cursed the one who offers the bribe, 
the one who receives it, and the one who arranges it” (Islam Basics, 2008). The Old 
Testament frequently addresses the crime of bribery. “And you shall take no bribe, for a 
bribe blinds the clear-sighted and subverts the cause o f those who are in the right” 
(Exodus 23:8) and “For I know how many are your transgressions and how great are your 
sins, you who afflict the righteous, who take a bribe, and turn aside the needy in the gate” 
(Amos 5:12). In the New Testament, Judas betrays Jesus for a bribe and the priests bribe 
the guards at Jesus’ tomb in order to persuade them to lie about the resurrection (Matthew 
27). The Ottomans viewed bribery as a form of corrupt governance that necessitated the 
punishment o f guilty official and unofficial power-holders (Ergene, 2001, p. 59). Under 
the Magna Carta of 1215 the English king's officials were prohibited from taking
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commodities without paying for them in an attempt to eradicate corruption. Corruption 
was an important concern of early American political philosophy. In his notes from the 
Constitutional Convention, James Madison recorded that 15 delegates employed the temi 
corruption no less than 54 times in the context of presidential elections, impeachment, 
multiple office holding, and the dependency of one arm o f government upon another 
(Savage, 1994, p. 177). In late Victorian England, the phenomenon of selling peerages 
was viewed as corrupt, especially in the Lloyd George era (Hanham, 1960, p. 277).
Today, international treaties forbidding bribery in business have been signed by all 
Western countries. Extensive anti-corruption legislation exists within most countries and 
the European Union has also enacted comprehensive anti-corruption policies.
Yet, despite this seemingly strong moral aversion to the idea of corruption, it has been 
and remains pervasive and deeply embedded in political systems in much o f the world. 
Corruption by a few special interests is found in all societies no matter what their form of 
govenunent (Huntington, 1991, p. 27). Corruption is a part of human society, found in 
countries large and small, rich and poor, developed or not (World Bank, 2007). In some 
developing countries illicit payments may equal a large fraction of GDP (Shleifer and 
Vislmy, 1993, p. 599). Corrupt public officials constitute one o f the most hannful 
problems facing governments in developing countries (Klitgaard, 1998, p. 6). Corruption 
has been widely associated with African etlmic violence in the past decade (Diamond, 
2002). In the post-communist countries of Europe, corruption remains a serious problem 
even after EU membership (Reed, 2007). EU progress reports on would-be members, 
notably in the Western Balkans, continually identify corruption as rampant. The informal 
realities of norms fail to track fonual written law. This contradiction raises interesting
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issues which have attracted academics to develop theories o f its causes and 
consequences.
Economists have consistently argued that corruption slows economic growth and 
retards foreign direct investment. It denies much-needed revenue to govermuents, 
increases transaction costs, reduces productivity, reduces incentives, and affects equitable 
distribution (Perkins, et al, 2001, p. 162). Political scientists, on the other hand, have not 
always held such a rigid viewpoint. Joseph Nye (1967, p.419), for example, suggested 
that corruption promotes economic development because it is an important source of 
capital when governments lack the capacity to tax a surplus, cuts red tape and overcomes 
the shortcomings o f inadequate administrative resources, provided a means of 
overcoming racial discrimination by allowing minority groups “access to the political 
decisions necessary for him to provide his skills”, helps overcome divisions within ruling 
elite, and helps ease the transition from traditional to modem society. Neo-Marxists of 
the 1970s viewed cormption as a by-product of capitalist democracy and the international 
capitalist system in which lower-class groups are exploited (Montinola and Jackman, 
2002, p. 149).
Samuel Huntington (1968, p. 113) wrote that “corruption provides immediate, 
specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated 
from society. Cormption may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system 
in the same way that reform is”. Other political scientists such as Waterbury (1973), Leys 
(1987), Werner (1989), and Becquart-Leclerq (1989) have, in the past, argued its positive 
aspects. Heidenheimer (2004) suggests that cormption is often framed in terms o f the 
values o f particular local and ethnic communities. As examples, he described how there
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were eities and areas of the 20”’ eentury United States where mayors and eongressmen 
eontinued to be reeleeted even though their loeal, regional and state peers had repeatedly 
labeled and eondemned them as eorrupt. Seligson (2002, p. 409) observed that during the 
cold war the United States and its allies tolerated eorrupt regimes in the third world, so 
long as those regimes were joined in the struggle against communism. Today, however, 
most academics overwhelmingly do agree that, though it is often tolerated, corruption has 
a destructive effect on both society and govermnent.
Corruption has been found to undermine accountability, opemiess, and equality 
Corruption severs citizens from collective decision making, the very link that defines 
democracy (Warren, 2004, p. 328). Corruption reduces support for democracy in both 
mature and newly established democracies (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003, p. 91). It 
undermines governance, economic growth, and, ultimately, the stability of countries and 
regions (Spector, 2005, p. 7). Corruption introduces fundamental economic distortions 
that include impacting supply and demand, reducing foreign investment, reducing 
efficiencies, and excessive public infrastructure. Countries are poorer overall when 
corruption levels are high (Rose-Aekennan, 1999, p. 3). Social impacts o f corruption 
include criminal activity, reduction of work ethic, enviromnental hann, and decreased 
political legitimacy. Corruption is inherently contradictory to and irreconcilable with 
democracy (Transparency International, 2006).
Anderson and Tverdova's (2003) analysis of 16 democracies connected levels of 
corruption with perceptions of government performance and trustworthiness. The authors 
consistently found that corruption leads people to believe that their political system 
perfonns worse than it could and was not trustworthy. Werner (1983, p. 149) theorizes
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that the dysfunctionality due to corruption would be increased by spillover effects 
whereby corruption grows and affects increasing portions of society. Spillover effect is 
most evident when leaders become corrupt. Here, corruption affects the “trust, loyalty, 
and personal integrity of their followers”, in other words, corruption affects legitimacy. 
Patrick Dobel (1978) wrote that corruption was a source of decay o f trust, loyalty and 
concern among citizens. Dobel theorized that corruption is an inverse function of moral 
loyalty, which is necessary for a stable political order. Loyalty is thus an important aspect 
of legitimacy. Dobel suggested that it is the extensive inequality resulting from wealth, 
power and status, originating in selfishness and pride that generates corruption. Members 
o f the elite who exchange their own loyalty to society for self gain undermine the loyalty 
given to them by the general citizenry. Without civic loyalty individuals cannot employ 
self-discipline to suppress “self-interested desires”; thus legitimacy and democracy 
decline (Dobel, 1978, p. 960).
Seligson (2002) separates “legitimacy” into five dependent variables: the guarantee of 
a fair trial, respect for political institutions, pride for the political system, support for the 
political system, and trust in police. When controlling for demographic and 
socioeconomic factors o f gender, age, education, income, and party affiliation, Seligson’s 
findings refute the functional view of corruption. According to Seligson, higher 
con*uption is significantly associated with lower support for legitimacy in each country. 
Furthermore, legitimacy and interpersonal trust are also correlated in three o f the four 
countries. Seligson concludes that individuals personally experiencing corruption may be 
less likely to be trusting, a contributor to legitimacy. Canache and Allison (2005) also 
examined the relationship between corruption and citizen support for incumbent
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governments in Latin America. Their findings again demonstrate that when citizens 
perceive political corruption, there is a corresponding decline in opinion of both political 
officials and institutions. Mishler and Haerpfers (1998) found in their cross-national 
study of Central and East European states that higher levels o f corruption correlated to 
lower levels of regime support. Mishler and Rose (2001) found that higher levels of 
corruption were related to lower levels of political trust in their study of East Central 
European States. Mungui-Pippidi (2003) observes that in Eastern and Central Europe, 
corruption linked to everyday life and the public services administered by the state are the 
most burdensome to citizens. In these post-communist countries the politicization of low- 
level state jobs “runs deep” since political parties support a “wide range o f cronies” 
(Mungui-Pippidi 2003, p. 81). Moreover, corrupt favors may be used to acknowledge or 
establish superior social status amongst what Max Weber termed “status societies” 
(Mungui-Pippidi 2003, p. 82). In such instances, financial gain may not be the motivator; 
however, such situations undermine public trust and collective action and encourage 
cynicism (Mungui-Pippidi 2003, p. 82).
A fundamental premise o f democracy is that, through human agency, citizens are able 
to influence the political decision making process (O’Donnell, 2004). In a democracy, 
corruption interferes with human agency because it causes the system to shift from being 
one o f representation to one of dependence. Corruption breaks the link between the 
people’s power to vote and collective decisions (Warren, 2004, p. 328). It reduces 
political competition and undermines popular political participation. Support for popular 
opposition parties can decline due to the fear o f intimidating cronies. There is also a loss 
of confidence in civil society with less motivation to form independent political
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organizations. Because it occurs in secret, corruption undermines fairness and trust. Trust 
facilitates human association and helps establish a union between political institutions 
and citizens. Trust encourages sociability and participation with others and enriches 
interpersonal ties (Sztompka, 1999, pp. 24-30). Corruption erodes the rule of law, and as 
the rule of law recedes, so do accountability, responsiveness, freedom and political 
equality (Merkel and Croissant, 2004, p. 201).
Perceptions of corruption can alienate voters and affect electoral outcomes. In his 
study of the effects of electoral fraud in Mexico, McCann and Dominguez (1998, p. 499) 
found that widespread suspicions o f corruption affected electoral outcomes by making it 
less likely that potential opposition supporters would vote. This was because they thought 
voting under such circumstances was a waste of time. This weakening of the opposition 
impeded the democratic alternation of power. Unwittingly, opposition leaders may 
discourage their own voters if they overemphasize corruption in their reformist agendas. 
In their study o f democratic commitment in transition societies, Evans and Whitefield 
(1995) predicted that the consequences of individual experience with such factors as 
corruption would impact public attitude and behavior. They suggest that the performance 
of new political institutions produces perceptions of the workings of democracy. Results 
of their survey supported their hypothesis. They found a clear connection between 
political factors and commitment to democracy.
Johnson, in his study of political instability in Latin America, observes that public 
fiscal dishonesty encourages tax evasion and inefficient use of capital. According to 
Johnson, capital is typically hoarded and invested in prestige items or usury with 
proceeds hidden from taxation or concealed abroad. Also, local value systems sustain
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these corrupt practices, inhibiting socioeconomic improvements. This, in turn, causes 
frustration, political alienation and instability (Johnson, 1964). In their study of post- 
Soviet Ukraine, Round, Williams and Rodgers (2008), demonstrate how corruption can 
creep into the workplace. They observe how bribes have to be paid by individuals to 
obtain employment. Salaries are paid informally to avoid taxation. This informal salary 
system facilitates the exploitation of workers and drives them to the surreptitious 
eeonomic seetor. Jong-Sung and Khagram (2005) find that eoiTuption inereases 
inequality, whieh in turn fosters a norm of eorruption as aeeeptable behavior. The proeess 
manifests a vieious inequality-eoiruption-inequality circle.
A Decade of Corruption 
There is a substantial body o f evidenee proving that endemie eorruption has 
continued unabated in Bosnia since Dayton. Mueh of this corruption is a continuation of 
war profiteering and black-market aetivity that began during the war. In the first few 
years after the war, criminal elements on all sides gained control of what was left of the 
Bosnian economy. A wealthy and elite class of power brokers thus emerged, which now 
hinders reform efforts (Singer, 2000, p.32.). Richard Holbrooke, designer o f Dayton, 
charaeterized these individuals as “erooks pretending to be nationalists” (Agenee Franee 
Press, 2000). Mungiu-Pippidi (2003) eoneludes that eorruption of a magnitude suffieient 
to plague an entire society may not be eaptured by the normal theoretieal model. She 
writes that the coneept o f corruption itself “does not sufficiently deseribe the 
politieization of an entire state administration that functions only when palms are 
greased” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003, p. 80). Consequently, Bosnian institutions of
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accountability simply do not seem to perform as they do in Western countries. She also 
concludes that “business-related corruption may involve the most money”, but it is 
“corruption linked to everyday life and the public services the state administration is 
supposed to deliver” that is the most burdensome to citizens (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003, p.
8iy
The international community’s attention was first drawn to corruption’s seriousness 
when a 1999 New York Times article alleged that one billion dollars in international 
construction aid had gone missing (New York Times, 1999). The missing funds were 
supposed to have funded the reconstruction of roads, buildings, and schools as well as 
provide municipal services throughout Bosnia. Since then, non government organizations 
and government agencies have regularly published reports documenting the extent o f the 
problem, each warning that it tlireatens long-term political stability. The following 
paragraphs list relevant quotes from a small selection o f these documents. They also 
include several high-profile corruption related prosecutions and news articles. All 
illustrate the seriousness and extensiveness of the corruption problem in Bosnia.
Bosnia's 1998 through 2008 Corruption Profile
1998; A country assessment project sponsored by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) summarized the extent o f corruption in BiH as 
follows: “For the economic and democratic development o f Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
succeed, the large-scale fraud and corruption in the government must be reduced 
substantially. Bank fraud, customs fraud, tax fraud, procurement fraud, bribery, extortion
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and an active organized crime network severely undermine economic and democratic 
reforms” (USAID, 1998).
1999: The Office of the High Representative Anti Crime and CoiTuption Unit 
Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy for Bosnia states: “Three years after the 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord, the attention of the international community 
has focused with increasing intensity on the endemic fraud and corruption in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (OHR, 1999). In his September 1999 address before the US House of 
Representatives International Relations Committee, David Dlouhy, Director of the US 
State Department’s Office o f Bosnia, stated that “the problem o f corruption is undeniably 
one of the prime obstacles to achieving the goals set forth at Dayton” (Dlouhy, 1999).
2000: Harold J. Johnson, o f the Govermnent Accounting Office''^ (GAO), in 
testimony before the U.S. Congress, stated that “there is a near consensus opinion among 
officials that endemic crime and corruption in Bosnia is threatening the successful 
implementation o f the Dayton Peace Agreement” (Johnson, 2000). That same year, in an 
article published in the World Policy Journal, Peter Singer wrote “Many of the Bosnian 
Political Leaders derived their power from their positions at the helm of sophisticated 
war-profiteering operations that continue to dominate the black market -  an underground 
economy that still makes up roughly 50 percent o f the economy as a whole” (Springer, 
2000, p. 32).
2001 : A World Bank corruption study published this year concluded that “the 
corruption pattern in BiH is characterized by (a) high level o f public concern with 
corruption, (b) low level of public trust in the govermnents, (c) state capture and conflict
Harold Johnson was Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, 
National Security and International Affairs Division.
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of interest, (d) public administration inefficiencies reflected in widespread bribery in 
public offices, (e) distorted business environment, (f) a significant burden on poor 
households, exacerbating poverty and inequality” (World Bank, 2001). A report prepared 
by the European Stahility Initiative determined that “The lack o f governance capacity, the 
depth of the economic crisis, the level of corruption and the weakness of public 
institutions risk undermining the long-term stahility o f the country” (ESI, 2001, p. 22). 
Also this year, a perceptions survey^® conducted by USAID on corruption among public 
officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed that 45 to 55 percent o f respondents felt that 
corruption among doctors was widespread (USAID, 2002). Transparency International’s 
2001 Global Corruption Report states that in the former Yugoslavia “corruption remains 
rampant and an integral part of doing business” (Transparency International, 2001, p. 
124).
2002: In his 2002 inaugural speech. High Representative Lord Paddy Ashdown 
commented that “the grip of criminality and corruption is strengthening” (OHR, 2002). 
Later this year, the annual Nations in Transit Country Report, published by the United 
Nations, concluded that “corruption is a key obstacle to economic reform and the 
establishment of the rule of law in Bosnia” (United Nations, 2002, p. 122). Transparency 
International’s first Corruption Perception Study for Bosnia found corruption the second 
most serious problem in Bosnian society (Transparency International, 2002, p. 23). A 
public opinion survey performed by the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance found corruption the second issue o f concern in Republika Srpska 
(IDEA, 2002, p.6).
As quoted in Governance and Corruption in Public Health Care Systems, Maureen 
Lewis. Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 78 January 2006.
51
2003; Paddy Ashdown, Bosnia’s fourth High Representative, foreed Mirko Sarovie, 
the president o f Republika Srpska, to resign beeause o f eorruption allegations (Chandler, 
2006, p. 86). Later that year, Mila Gadzie was also foreed to resign as Minister of Foreign 
Trade and Eeonomie Relations in the state government for similar reasons (Chandler, 
2006, p. 86). A World Bank survey this year, evaluating the pereeption o f eorruption 
among business managers, public officials, and the general public, observed that fifty 
pereent o f publie offieials admitted aecepting bribes in exehange for altering the eontent 
of legislation; one-third noted that eolleagues who refused bribes were marginalized and 
sometimes even forced to quit (United Nations, 2003).
2004: Transparency International’s second Corruption Perception Study for Bosnia 
found that political parties “calling for anti-corruption measures were doing so just for 
the sake of eleetions while their main goal was to assume eontrol of eorruption ehannels 
from previous governments” and that “90 pereent of BiH eitizens found themselves very 
mueh affeeted by eorruption and pereeive it in almost all spheres of their day-to-day life 
and work” (Transparency International, 2004). A separate opinion poll performed by 
Transpareney International showed that 93.7 percent o f the University o f Banja Luka^ 
students believed that there was eorruption at the faeulties in Banja Luka, with nepotism 
at exams the most eommon fonn o f eorruption, followed by bribing professors at 
admission exams (One World Southeast Europe, 2004).
2005: A eorruption study published by the Christian Miehelsen Institute found that 
“eorruption is rampant in all spheres o f publie and political life in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” and that “eorruption exists in all its faeets -  bribery, nepotism.
Banja Luka is the eapitol o f Republika Srpska.
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embezzlement, diversion o f public funds, tax fraud, illegal rent seeking, kick-back 
schemes etc.” (CMI, 2005). Corruption is cited as a problem for doing business by 45 
percent o f respondents, especially large companies, in the 2005 World Bank Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (World Bank, 2005). A survey 
sponsored by the International Finance Corporation found that 25 percent o f firms in 
Bosnia identified corruption as a major constraint and 70 percent expected to give gifts in 
meetings with tax officials (International Finance Corporation, 2005). Also this year, 
Radojka Prastalo, a representative o f the Bosnian Serb association o f professors, stated 
publicly that "incompetent and immoral individuals have turned Bosnian universities into 
places where you can buy diplomas, titles and professions" {Mail and Guardian, 2005).
2006: The 2006 World Bank Worldwide Aggregate Governance Indicator for Control 
of Corruption shows no change for Bosnia between 1996 and 2006 (World Bank, 2007). 
A survey performed by the GfK Centre for Market Research found that 58 percent of 
Bosnians felt that bribes were an absolutely natural part o f life, and that 93 percent 
believed they lived in a corrupt state (GfK Centre, 2006). A fonner member o f the 
Bosnian presidency, Dragan Covic, was convicted this year and sentenced to five years in 
prison for his involvement in organized crime and tax evasion (Freedom House, 2007). 
The sixty-second Rose-Roth Seminar held in Tirana, Albania concluded that “the 
persistence o f corruption at various levels o f their societies, as well as the strength o f 
organized crime networks througliout the region, was the most serious challenge in the 
Balkan region” (NATO, 2006). In Transparency International’s 2006 amiual Corruption 
Perception Index, BiH shared 93rd to 98th place out of 163 countries with a score o f 2.9 
out of 10. This ranked the country among the most corrupt countries in the world
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(Transparency International, 2006). Also this year, the 2006 South-East Europe 
Barometer found that over 85 pereent of the population believed eorruption was eommon 
in the medical profession, and among private officials, judges and public prosecutors, 
members of parliament, customs officials, and police (Europe Barometer, 2006). The 
World Bank reported that “persistent difficulties in political uncertainty and corruption 
are some of the key constraints to business development and investment” (World Bank, 
2006).
2007; Transpareney International’s 2007 National Integrity System Study o f Bosnia- 
Herzegovina concluded that eorruption thrives at higher political and administrative 
levels, and is pervasive at the loeal level (Transpareney International, 2007). A 2007 
Balkan-wide Gallup survey showed that in Bosnia and Herzegovina 86 pereent think 
eorruption is widespread in business and 81 pereent think eorruption is widespread in 
government (Gallup, 2007).
2008; In an interview, former High Representative Paddy Ashdown said: "We 
lovingly forget that item number one is always the rule of law. It is not eleetions. I'm 
afraid. If you have eleetions before you establish the rule of law then all you do is elect 
the criminals who ran the war. What you create is not a democracy but a criminally 
eaptured space. That is what we had in Bosnia. Corruption is now in the marrow and 
hone of Bosnian society" {Sydney Morning Herald, 2008). In what is touted to be the 
most comprehensive and thoroughgoing examination o f the social and political health of 
BiH ever, the United Nations Development Programme concluded that Bosnians “are not 
interested in de-mining, prosecuting war-eriminals, police reform and defense issues.
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Instead they opt for improvements in their living standards, a unified country and anti­




Qualitative in-depth field interview techniques are applied in this study. Several 
factors led to this choice of research method. Initial research did not begin with an 
articulated hypothesis. The original intent o f the researcher was to explore factors 
affecting personal political loyalties and then develop a hypothesis from the subsequent 
data. However, this approach changed during the interviews when a majority of 
participants commented that political loyalties were secondary to concerns about political 
ethics. Qualitative methods were deemed appropriate given the subjective nature of 
political attitude and the corruption-legitimacy link. Bosnian nornis and culture are often 
far removed from Europe and the United States. It was felt that in-depth interviews might 
provide a hitherto unexploited opportunity for insight into Bosnian political psychology. 
Qualitative results might also complement preexisting quantitative data. It was hoped that 
this approach would deepen understandings o f Bosnian political attitude and, at the same 
time, provide a testing ground for the qualitative perspective.^^
It is worth noting that that the researcher lived and worked in Sarajevo from 1996 
to 1998 and has stayed in close contact with several Bosnians since then. This long-term 
stay familiarized the researcher with Bosnian viewpoints and for the purposes off this 




Schutt (2006, p. 268) identifies several advantages of in-person interviews. First, 
from a practical standpoint, personal perspectives generally foster a greater understanding 
than those acquired from structured survey interviews and questionnaires. Second, 
personalized interviews are known to result in higher question response rates. Third, the 
physical and social circumstances of an interview can be controlled by the researcher, and 
responses can be probed and clarified. Surveys also present a host of problematic 
phenomena such as response instability and the effects o f question ordering (Zaller and 
Feldman, 1998, pp. 580).
Zaller and Feldman (1998, p. 579-584) also observe that in a typical survey, 
individuals do not express opinions with sufficient specificity, answers to survey 
questions have been found to be unstable and incoherent, and most individuals base their 
responses to survey questions on whatever thouglits are at hand at the moment of 
answering. Consequently, suiwey questions are answered randomly and often to only 
politely indulge interviewers (Converse, 1964). Anderson (1988, p. 230) suggests that the 
dominant survey-based methodology which employs statistical patterns in data to derive 
inferences about beliefs does not provide clear understanding o f how people connect 
ideas presented as survey items. She argues that in-depth interviews provide a more 
fruitful way o f understanding the process by which people think and reason about politics 
(ibid, p. 230).
Schuman and Scott (1987, p. 957 ) found that there is a significant difference between 
answers to closed questions and open questions constructed in a respondent’s own words 
and that closed questions sharply restrict frames of reference by focusing the
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respondent’s attention on limited alternatives. For example, a survey eommissioned by 6  
Tuathail and O’Loughlin (2005) asked respondents the following question; “Some people 
say that the eurrent eonstitution o f Bosnia-Herzegovina does not work, to what degree do 
you agree with this opinion?” With 72.6 pereent agreeing, the authors eonelude that there 
is a eonsensus for ehange. This eonelusion is not questioned by the researeher per se. 
However, when the researeher queried respondents with a university edueation about 
their level of knowledge regarding the state eonstitution, a majority admitted they knew 
little about it exeept that it was part o f the Dayton Aeeords. Henee our belief that 
inferenees gleaned from surveys ean be validated with qualitative interviews.
Rationale for Partieipant Seleetion 
For the purposes o f this thesis, eomprehensive in-depth interviews were also preferred 
beeause they bring to light subtle influenees sueh as the “paradox of distanee”. In the 
paradox o f distanee, the publie holds negative views o f govermnent and publie 
administrators in the abstraet, but they have favorable views of governmental programs 
with whieh they interaet and favorable views o f the bureauerats whom they eneounter 
(Frederiekson and Frederickson, 1995, p. 166). In addition. Converse (2004) observed 
that eitizens o f transitional demoeraeies may answer polling questions with what he 
termed non-attitudes, namely ad hoe opinions that individuals have not eonsidered or 
held before the question was asked. The researeher was also eoneemed when preliminary 
diseussions with colleagues in Sarajevo suggested that, given both the ideologieal aspeets 
of formal education and its dubious quality in many areas o f Bosnia, it is unlikely that 
many respondents would fully understand politieally oriented survey questions and eould
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not provide meaningful a n sw e rs .T h e  caution that elites are more politically competent 
than the general public is both empirically and theoretically sound. Robert Michels (1962, 
p. 105) observed that, by virtue o f their formal training, educated leaders are superior to 
the led. The incompetence of the uneducated masses provides the educated leader both a 
practical and moral justification. According to the “elitist theory o f democracy”, elites are 
more strongly committed to democratic values such as political tolerance than ordinary 
citizens (Gibson and Duch, 1991, p. 191) and therefore should be more aware of 
democratic system deficiencies. Zaller’s reception axiom states that the greater a person’s 
level of cognitive engagement with an issue (the middle class can be classified as such), 
the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend political messages 
concerning that issue (Dobrzynska and Blais, 2007, p. 260). For these reasons it was 
decided that only university-educated informants would be chosen for the interviews.
Interview Setting
The interviews were held during a two-week visit to Sarajevo in February 2008. The 
population under study comprised thirty-five volunteer adult citizens o f the Federation of 
BiH and Republika Srpska that either lived or commuted to work in the city of Sarajevo. 
Eleven o f the participants were known personally to the researcher. Two participants 
subsequently declined to participate. Thus, the final sample consists o f 31 subjects. Six 
Bosnian Serbs, four Bosnian Croats and twenty-three Bosnian Muslims were interviewed. 
Six females and twenty seven males were included. All subjects were employed. Three
See the Bertelsmann Transformation Index Country Report for confirmation o f 
Bosnia’s education problems. URL: http://www.bertelsmann-transformation- 
index.de/177.0.html? &L= 1
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had previous experienee working for a foreign eompany in Bosnia or abroad. Seleetion 
was largely opportunistie. Aeeess was gained with the assistanee o f a gatekeeper who 
identified and approaehed individuals willing to partieipate in open and eandid interviews 
about loyalty and problems in their respeetive entities.
Interviews were earried out in publie settings such as restaurants and eafes. To ensure 
eonfidentiality, interviews were diserete and out of hearing range of non-partieipants. To 
establish rapport with eaeh respondent, eoffee was purehased and some brief aneedotal 
stories were shared. Relevant personal details were then eonfirmed. This introductory 
period lasted approximately fifteen minutes. Before eaeh interview, the purpose of the 
projeet was explained. It was emphasized that painful or eontroversial subjeets sueh as 
personal experienees during the war would not be raised, and if  subjeets beeame 
uneomfortable during the interview they would be allowed to stop. Eaeh aeknowledged 
their understanding and then gave verbal approval before partieipating. Eaeh subjeet was 
asked separately if their respeetive interview could be reeorded. It was explained that the 
recordings were for later analysis by me only and that the individuals would remain 
anonymous. At the eompletion o f taped sessions, informants were given a seeond 
opportunity to destroy the reeorded data. A eommitment was also made to destroy the 
reeordings after projeet eompletion. It also was made elear that the translator who was 
present would respect strict privacy concerns. This was a matter o f speeial worry sinee 
the topie o f eorruption was to be addressed. Seven subjeets gave permission to record.
Interviews were open in nature and subjeets were allowed to digress from question 
topics. The interviews followed four broad themes: the respondent’s pereeption of 
loyalty, attitude about government performance, views of the European Union, and
60
attitude toward corruption. The interview methodology followed the principals of 
qualitative interviewing as described by Kvale (1996). The trigger question was: “Wliat 
does the word loyalty mean to you?” Consistent with the goal of the research, pre­
prepared thematic questions addressing the topics of interest were posed periodically to 
sustain the interview.^'' However, respondents were given considerable leeway and were 
encouraged to be verbose. An effort was made to lead informants to reveal their 
underlying rationales and personal attitudes. Identifying a logical link between 
knowledge of, or personal experienee with, eormption and political alienation was of 
particular interest. Most were willing to talk at length and in great detail without 
prompting, although it was immediately found that the tape recorder had a negative effect 
on openness. In the cases where taping was allowed, informants provided additional 
information after taping was stopped. Actual discussion times lasted an average o f forty- 
five minutes. After this duration, both subjeet and translator beeame fatigued. Another 15 
minutes o f general conversation typically followed the interviews.
Data Analysis Procedure 
There is no intent to interpret the interview data to establish sample generalizability. 
This qualitative research is exploratory and descriptive only. The researcher's goal was to 
learn whether a source o f political instability, other than ethno-nationalism, might exist, 
and to acquire a description of this source "in the terms and situational context" (Sehutt, 
2006, p. 109) of Bosnians themselves. The "gatekeeper" was utilized to gain a sufficient 
degree o f initial trust and rapport between participant and researeher, with the goal of
24 Topics o f open ended discussion are found in Appendix A.
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eliciting deeply personal opinions that would not he provided through a quantitatively 
oriented survey questionnaire. This was necessary because one topic of conversation 
addressed corruption. The comments made in these interviews about corruption would 
not have been be made without a great degree of trust.
Although the interviews were perfonned at one point in time, it should not be viewed 
as a single "snapshot". Attitudes are acknowledged by the participants as changing over 
time. To acquire a level o f validity, the researcher followed the guidance o f Wolcott 
(1990, pp. 127-135). Three of his nine points were important processes in this research. 
First, efforts were made to record conversations accurately and fully. This “minimizes the 
potential influence o f some line o f interpretation or analyses that might record 
selectively” (ibid.). Second, writing was started early in order to record first impressions. 
Otherwise, over time writings may become distorted due to discernment and reflection 
(ibid). Third, an effort has been made to “let readers see for themselves” by “capturing 
the expressed thoughts of others rather than relying too singularly on what was observed 
and interpreted” (ibid). All interviews, including taped sessions, were translated from 
Bosnian into English in real time. Translation was performed by the gatekeeper. The 
researcher synthesized the data and interpreted the subjects’ experiences by participating 
directly in the interviews, took extensive notes, transcribed the recorded interviews, and 
identified experiential themes in the respondent’s dialogues (Giorgi, 1985, p. 85). 
Dominant themes were subsequently identified and summarized. Transcriptions and 
supporting notes were made manually by the researcher in English during the interview. 
These documents serve as the data for this analysis.
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The transcription of each interview session was read several times in order to identify 
pertinent plirases, words and themes. A coding scheme was developed to match (see 
Appendix B). The code library was entered into the Ethnograph Version 5.08e^^ database. 
The handwritten transcripts were then typed into the software database. The electronic 
versions of the transcripts were then broken down into text segments which were 
assigned an appropriate code from the code library. The software sorting and grouping 
capabilities were then used to align transcript content to relevant topic categories and 
codes. For example, a table was generated that listed all transcripts with respective text 
coded as “corruption” and “alienated”. These steps allowed the researcher to estimate the 
frequency and variety of themes.
Interview Findings and Discussion 
Three interrelated themes emerged from the interviews. First, it is found that, among 
all ethnic groups in the sample, loyalty to one’s respective entity is now outweighed by 
the desire for more effective governance at all l e v e l s . T h e  idea of unconditional loyalty 
to the Republika Srpska or the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina was challenged by 
the participants. Secondly, corruption and poor governance, although widely tolerated in 
the past, have now reached such levels and permeated such a broad range o f society, that 
they have become a huge human burden and are perceived as the greatest impediment to 
social, economic and political progress. Third, the majority o f respondents exhibit 
symptoms of political alienation. Again, the primary source of this alienation is
Etlinograph v5.08, developed by Qualls Research.
26 The phrase ‘all levels’ here means State, Cantonal, and Municipal government.
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corruption and poor governance. It is important to note however, that the participant’s 
university edueation may have sensitized them to eorrupt behavior.
These three dominant themes guide the diseussions that follow. Actual interview 
quotes are entered to supplement the discussion. For clarity purposes, these quotations are 
bracketed. At times there was difficulty interpreting expressions, so in some instances, 
only partial sentences are included. Also, at times discussions digressed from the topie. 
This text is not included. The presence of an ellipsis indicates that the quotation was 
extracted from a longer sentence for brevity. Grammar is not always proper, sinee there is 
an attempt to capture the wording as it was translated, where possible. These 
summarizations should not be interpreted to imply precise quantification or 
generalizability across the Bosnian population. They are intended only to provide a rough 
characterization of how frequently similar attitudes were expressed and how they were 
formed.
Theme One - Political Loyalty 
Serbs participants still identify with the Republika Srpska. This is reflected in the 
following statements: [“Republika Srpska is a country for Serbs”]. [“There is patriotism 
to Republika Srpska, loyalty to other Serbs and my village, family and friends.. .but, no 
loyalty to country Bosnia”]. Muslims continue to favor dissolution o f the entities and 
express solidarity with the country o f Bosnia. [“Loyalty means loyalty to the country, not 
the entity”]. [“I support Bosnia the country and think the entities should be removed.. .not 
to hurt Serbs but to make one country”]. [“Political loyalty is to Bosnia the country”]. 
[“My loyalty is to Bosnia. I am not interested in the Federation”].
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Loyalty was the first topic to be raised by a majority o f participants and comments 
were given in a firm tone. This can be attributed to the faet that the subjects were nervous 
at first. They may have anticipated a challenging response from the researeher, but when 
they found none their mood quickly became more relaxed and open. No Muslim or Croat 
participants expressed loyalty or allegiance to the Federation o f Bosnia and Hercegovina. 
Two Muslim males who had traveled and worked in Europe expressed their loyalty to the 
European Union. [“I want to be a European and want Bosnia to be part of Europe”]. [“I 
have loyalty to the EU - no loyalty to the etlmic groups, as these are a cover for party 
power. I am a citizen o f Europe”].
As the participants relaxed, it was observed that their etlmo-political attitude was no 
longer being constructed in terms o f nationalism and hatred. It appeared that lines of 
allegiance are now blurred and loyalty is becoming less dependent on ethnicity. Although 
most respondents were quick to express their respective preferences regarding entity 
configuration, it was not communicated to the researeher in a context of hatred or 
defiance, nor did it overshadow the interview as it undoubtedly would have a decade ago. 
One Muslim respondent characterized this change when he stated: [“ .. .even the most 
radical Serbs are not looking for etlmieally pure areas”]. In some eases, discussions about 
etlmic loyalty beeame almost nostalgic in nature. [“Well I used to be loyal to Bosnia. You 
know, this war was for Bosnia, not for the Federation.. .we were fighting for a country 
not for this or that entity”], [“Just imagine what it was like to have your country dissolve 
-  it was fine to be a Yugoslav”] [“So these leaders are joined like strong brothers beeause 
they are fighting together and this is a powerful force.. .”].In the view o f several other 
respondents, ethnic political issues are no longer eonsidered to be the primary factor in
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political decision making. Many respondents stated that they were tired o f discussing 
ethnicity and that the use of this to portray Bosnian politics is inaccurate. [“I do not care 
about Republika Loyalty anymore as long as a system is put in place”]. [“There are no 
entity loyalties. All citizens want good is governance...”]. [“Loyalty to entity is not 
realistic question. The war and what is happening now is ahout power and money”]. 
[“Ethnic questions are not applicable”].
All participants seemed resigned to accept that the reality o f the de facto partition in 
Bosnia. Serhs have been compelled to sell their homes and move to the RS. Muslims 
have been pressured to do the same and move to the Federation. Yet, in several 
interviews, Serh respondents indirectly acknowledged that ultimately the Republika 
Srpska can never be an independent State. [“I don't know if  we can be independent our 
economy is too small”]’. [“Loyalty is a difficult thing to describe. I am loyal to Serhs, hut 
sometimes loyalty doesn't mean agreeing. Well, I am loyal to the idea of independent RS 
but this independence should be a modem independence. Not through an isolated RS but 
through some agreement with Bosnia and European Union. This is the best way for us”]. 
Similarly, some Muslim respondents, despite their Entity preference, were willing to 
agree to independence for the RS. [“I have loyalty to Bosnia. Entities should be dissolved 
- but never will be. So it seems we must live with this separation for a long time. I have 
no problem now letting Serhs have their own independence, but they should not get all 50 
percent o f land - say 30 percent. I don't care about it much let them have an independent 
country or join with Serbia”]. [“I have no problem with an independent RS but prefer one 
country..”].
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There was also awareness that ethnic loyalties were somewhat transient and that 
latent ethnic suspicions are used to manipulate vulnerable country residents during pre­
election periods. One can detect a distrust o f political parties due to this fear mongering. 
[“The parties have made us afraid of restarting war. People are afraid of killing. There 
has been some talk on television of a new war. This is party talk to scare people”]. [“I 
don't care about entities. But country people, many are now in Sarajevo, are frightened at 
election time, frightened of killing, they are easy to manipulate. But for me, 1 just want a 
country that will allow me to make myself better. Make some more money and buy a 
country house. So I don’t care if  there are entities or not. The question is not 
meaningful”]. [“Ethnic loyalties come up at election time only”]. [“Political parties that 
have enough money can go into the countryside and agitate the poor, suspicious country 
people and make them afraid of a return to violence - make them feel as if  someone could 
get killed again”]. [“This remains an issue today because politicians have kept it in our 
ears -  the parties keep us thinking about”]. [“Mostly uneducated from the country areas 
are manipulated by the ethnic rhetoric”].
The Dayton Accords and the State constitution were rarely discussed. The few 
comments made were either negative or neutral. Many appeared to have no knowledge of 
Dayton’s content. [“Dayton is not giving to us results. Every party is looking to the 
constitution for their own purposes only with no results”]. [“Yes, Dayton stopped the war 
but now everything is different. Dayton doesn't mean anything today”]. [“Dayton cannot 
help us, only EU membership can help Bosnia”]. [“The constitutions mean nothing and 
are just for foreigners to practice intervention”]. [“Our constitution does not work”].
[“No, I have no knowledge o f my constitution”]. It was also noted that some the subjects
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had little understanding of the concept o f democracy. [“I cannot describe details about 
democracy”]. It is concluded that a lack o f knowledge o f their eonstitution and a lack of 
understanding about democraey have not prevented Bosnians from reeognizing or 
responding to bad governance. Moreover, a poor opinion o f the Dayton Aeeords does not 
necessarily indieate ill feelings toward the United States. More than one subjeet 
suggested that America should come back and sort out their bad government. [“I just 
want a return of good govermnent. I am willing to let Ameriea eome baek and run the 
govermnent.. .anything would be an improvement”]. [“Well, do you think they ean help 
us stop politieians from stealing? Can you stop this? Can America come back and help us 
do this?]. [“Why doesn't America do something ahout it? Why don't they arrest the 
criminals?]. Looking outside their own govermnent and eountry is an indieation of 
diseouragement and alienation.
Theme Two - Corruption and Poor Governance 
Almost all partieipants demonstrated outrage toward connpt government offieials, 
public employees and elected politieians. [“Elected officials are eorrupt”]. [“Most seek 
offiee and high positions so they ean put their family and friends into other jobs”], 
[“ ...discouraged with politieians getting rich and ignoring their joh”]. [“Now they just try 
to become rich... corrupt. It is the only way they can acquire so much money. How else 
can they do it?”]. [“Politicians are corrupt - more than acceptable”]. [“They are 
politieians beeause they can become rich and they do this in many ways”]. [“Yes there is 
a serious problem of politieians putting their friends into position”]. [“Some politicians 
are caught already and are still running for office”]. [“There is no respect for the law and
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there is no concern by corrupt politicians about getting caught”]. [“There was a big 
problem with Electroprivreda^^ some years ago, not so long”]. [“I am very disappointed 
with elected officials because they seek personal profit in their jobs”]. [“Politicians are 
not there to help people they are there for themselves”]. [“They are making deals and 
doing wrong things to get rich”].
Some participants linked corrupt officials to war profiteers. [“Well, nobody had 
coffee during the war but some were selling it at a very high price. These people are still 
doing these things. They are very rich and very dangerous”]. Other participants were not 
timid about associating politicians with organized crime. [“It is the politicians who can be 
blamed for this because they think they are special and they became criminals. Even they 
are continuing business they started during the war. Many are nothing more than 
gangsters and mafia”]. [“This is what the parties really are, mafia”]. [“They are connected 
to the politicians. They are never arrested and politicians are helping them not us”]. [“I 
hate politicians. They are thieves and mafia”]. [“All of these politicians are small mafia”].
The judiciary, public employees, and police were also accused o f corruption.
[“Getting license.. .pay bribe to get drivers license”]. [“Also there is corruption in the 
education system. You can pay for a test pass, or to be accepted to university”]. [“So 
there are many crimes, especially at the border area.. .stolen cars”]. [“Also some police 
stops”]. [“You pay to escape false speeding ticket or traffic violation”]. [“I have 
witnessed a corrupt judge”]. [“Yes there is corruption everywhere. But, the most 
dangerous is politicians and judges. They are not afraid of being caught”]. Corruption in 
Bosnia’s medical system also angered many subjects. [“We can accept low employment
Electroprivreda is the Bosnian Public Electric Utility.
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but not corruption, especially medical services. Several hundreds o f is required to 
get average medical service”]. [“Health care requires cash payment to doctors, but 
supposed to be free”]. [“ .. .angry about having to pay bribes for medical care”]. [“ .. .some 
doctors have false credentials. And of course you must pay for medical service which 
should be free - or a small cost”]. [“ .. .can't get medical attention without a bribe”]. [“The 
doctor service you get depends on the amount of the bribe”]. [“Medical coverage for my 
son required a bribe”]. [“ .. .and medical care, all must pay”].
Participants expressed frustration that citizens could do nothing to end the corruption. 
It was commented that it would be physically dangerous for anyone trying to do so. 
Several subjects, while discussing the corrupt, stated: [“and there is no way to catch them 
and if you try you will be killed - yes you will be. It is dangerous. We know this, they are 
corrupt and do things they shouldn't. Even so we don't complain. Who will listen to us?]. 
[“People do not trust the politicians.. .they are very powerful and very dangerous”].
[“ .. .we can’t do anything to stop it. Nobody alone can stop them, it is too dangerous”]. 
[“These people are still doing these things. They are very rich and very dangerous”]. 
[“Corruption... I can’t tell you more than you have heard already. You know this is a 
very serious problem, and dangerous for anyone trying to stop it”].
It was also observed that complaints about corruption were often linked to comments 
regarding economic inequality. In the view of a number o f subjects, it is considered 
wrong for politicians to be self-serving, especially when average citizens are poor. This 
is an important observation since it provides a reason how anti-corruption attitudes are 
formed. [“No, corruption does not bother me usually, but it is becoming unfair because
The main currency in Bosnia is the Convertible Mark (KM).
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they are becoming very rich while most are poor in Srpska”]. [“Elected officials are 
corrupt. All of them were poor before the war. They had nothing before being elected 
into office or getting their positions. Now they have big houses and cars...”]. [“Also 
politicians are getting rich -  poor before election”]. [“Who will listen to us? We stay 
quiet and poor”]. [“This is a problem today. Politicians don't have respect for people”]. 
[“It is this hypocrisy, when people are suffering...”]. [“Patriotism, for what...politicians 
control everything and become rich and we are poor”].
Theme Three - Political Trust and Efficacy 
The majority o f subjects expressed a low degree o f confidence in goveimment. As 
pointed out earlier, this is a product o f low political efficacy. It is one consequence of 
estrangement from one’s government and a correlative o f political alienation. [“Bosnia 
was worth fighting for in 1993... but not now”]. [“There is no response from 
government. Most Bosnians will say the same. There is no input to government. I am 
very discouraged. OHR is not accountable to citizens. Is this democracy?], [“ ...absolutely 
no help or responsiveness from government. I am highly dissatisfied; anyone will tell you 
the same thing. I am generally not optimistic about Bosnia]. [“We have had several 
elections and an opportunity for effective government but failed. I will not vote anymore.
I don't have any faith in Bosnian politicians”]. [“I am generally frustrated about the bad 
situation in BiH. There has been no improvement since Dayton times”]. [“There is 
something wrong with the whole system. It is not just the politicians in power now, but 
because things remain the same even when politicians change. Something needs to 
change throughout the country. Citizens are apathetic and government takes advantage”].
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[“No I am not represented by government, no way to express my views or opinions even 
on a municipal level”]. [“1 am very frustrated due to the laek o f progress in BiH. It is like 
time has stopped. There is absolutely no help from the politicians”]. [“We need to eorreet 
this problem before we move forward. Bosnia needs a new government”]. [“1 really don't 
know what to do about this situation here. But anything would be better than what we 
have”]. [“Politicians do nothing. Something needs to be done but I don’t know how to fix 
it. No, there is no serviee from government. It is a joke. Politieians are not there to help 
people they are there for themselves. Politieians are isolated from us”].
A deeline in politieal partieipation, notably voting, is also symptomatie of politieal 
alienation. During the interviews, several partieipants stated that there is no point in 
voting because the government is ineffeetive and unresponsive. [“Many do not vote 
beeause they do not see BiH as a democraey”]. [“I probably will not vote. I don't see any 
need to partieipate. There are only bad ehoiees”]. [“We have had several eleetions and an 
opportunity for effeetive government but failed. I will not vote anymore”]. [“Maybe I 
will not vote”]. [“A eitizen votes but 1 have not voted beeause of the bad ehoiees”]. [“1 
am not voting again”]. [“Politieians are isolated from us. I will not vote next time. I voted 
in 1996, but no more”]. [“Citizens are losing interest in voting and being eitizens”].
[“Yes, 1 have voted in the past but I will not vote next time. Beeause nothing 
changes...”].
Anti-democratic radicalism is a third indicator of political alienation. It is the view of 
the majority of respondents that fighting eorruption and establishing good govemanee are 
needed urgently. Bosnians state that they are not capable of fighting eorruption within the 
present system. They fear corrupt officials linked with organized erime. Consequently, a
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forceful and authoritarian non-democratic form of government was advocated since it 
would exercise the necessary force for a quick and decisive solution. [“We need an 
authoritarian system now”]. [“I would welcome an authoritarian leader. I just want a 
return o f good government”]. [“I am willing to accept some forceful leadership - to make 
people obey the law and become good citizens”]. [“Citizens are apathetic and 
government takes advantage. But many are now angry to the point where they will act in 
rebellion - or support a strong leader”]. [“Yes I will support a stronger system that 
provides more discipline and law enforcement”]. [“I am tired o f politics and wish 
someone would step in and do something about it. Anything is better than what we now 
have. We need a strong forceful leader, authoritarian, a government like Putin's. Russia's 
system is good”]. [“I wish someone would get power that was strong enough to do 
something about it. We need a strong leader. I don't care if  it is a democracy or not. I 
don't care about politics or how it is done.. .just get things fixed. I don't care if  it is a 
police state”]. [“We need a forceful ruler who will put this mafia away in jail”]. [“But this 
is what we need, a strong police. It has become so bad, forget human rights. Let police 
shoot them ...”]. [“I really don't know what to do about this situation here. But anything 
would be better than what we have. You know we want some forceful leaders. Replace 
the old style leaders with someone new who is not afraid and cannot be purchased. We 
need to be controlled. We cannot govern ourselves well at this time. We have so little 
experience”]. [“I would be willing to do anything to fix this, even return to Tito days”] 
Many subjects also expressed that they would leave Bosnia if they were able. Support 
for EU membership was often due to the likelihood of acquiring a visa which would 
allow them to leave Bosnia and work in other European countries. [“I would leave BiH if
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I could, especially to work in Europe. I cannot do this without a passport and Visa”].
[“ .. .would leave if possible”]. [“When we get membership more educated people will 
leave”]. [“Yes, I support EU membership - it will allow me to get work in Europe”]. [“I 
hope we get EU membership soon so I can find a job”]. [“Yes, I favor EU membership 
because I can work in Germany - 1 have family there”]. [“I would leave Bosnia if  I 
could”]. [“Most will leave for work - especially the young. They see the EU as an escape 
from BiH”]. [“Few educated people left they continue to leave when they are able”]. 
[“Most Bosnians would leave now if  they were able”]. [“Yes, I would leave if  I could get 
a visa”]. [“Yes, I would leave if  I could get a visa to stay in Europe or Canada”]. [“I will 
leave Bosnia if I can...”].
Discussion
Although these observations are limited and not generalizable to a larger population, 
it is important to point out that for every one of the participants endemic corruption is the 
source of at least one symptom typical of political alienation from Bosnian governance. 
These symptoms include political apathy, a declining confidence in democracy, a desire 
to leave the country, and a viewpoint that some non-democratic methods o f governance 
may be an acceptable solution to the country's severe corruption problem. O f particular 
interest are the similarities between the comments regarding the nature o f corruption; for 
example bribery required to get service in the socialized health care system. The 
interviews also garnered a number of interesting secondary observations not addressed 
here in detail. For instance, the researcher was struck by the fact that there were no 
derogatory comments made about any of the ethnic groups. Each respondent spoke
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positively about their day-to-day encounters with individuals of different ethnicity. 
Comments were made about free and safe travel througli once dangerous towns. More 
than once it was commented that the police behaved fairly to Muslims in the Republika 
Srpska. Serbs frequently spoke kindly o f Muslims and Croats and visa versa. It was made 
clear to the researcher that questions about ethnic tension were no longer applicable to 
present day life in Bosnia. There was also a striking lack of awareness o f the concept of 
civil society. For example, none of the respondents considered volunteering to participate 
in political activities. The concept o f citizens having a responsibility to actively pursue 
holding elected officials accountable was foreign to the respondents. One o f the most 
insightful comments from the interviews was from a Muslim male who stated: [“the 
biggest problem in Bosnia is that people and politicians are not changing”]. Many 
indicated that they have simply given up and were controlling their immediate 
enviromnent by hiding from politics. [“ .. .now most of us hide in our small villages 
ignoring politics, and not caring who is elected...”]. It was also observed that there were 
no themes unique to any given ethnic group. All subjects communicated essentially the 
same urgent message, namely that government perfonnance, responsiveness of elected 
officials, and fighting corruption are their highest priorities.
It is important to bear in mind that many o f the preceding interpretations are derived 
from brief snippets of conversation interpreted from Bosnian to English, and then written 
down in real time. Under such research conditions, there is a dual risk of 
misunderstanding. The interpreter may misrepresent what has been spoken, and the 
researcher may further incorrectly record what has been interpreted. Furthennore, in 
some instances, the tenu "corruption" may serve as a derogatory "catch-all" term that
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doesn't mean corruption at all. Participants may be using this term too freely. More 
extensive research within a broader sample will be needed to detect this.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
What academics and politicians continue to say and write about Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is, more often than not, grounded in the assumption that it is an ethnicity paradigm that 
continues to cripple the country’s democratization. Because Bosnian politics have been 
framed in these terms for so long, this paradigm has become widely accepted as a on­
going political reality. This proposition is not unproblematic. The results o f this research 
tentatively suggest that, within Bosnia’s middle class, ethnicity based nationalism is no 
longer the primary source of political attitude formation. This conclusion is based, in part, 
on the premise that the Bosnian middle class possess a coherent and accurate 
understanding o f the current political and social undercuiTcnts within their country. Their 
understanding includes an awareness o f the behavior o f political elites and its 
implications. These individuals however, are not immune to discouragement and 
disaffection. What these individuals have stated herein strongly suggests a political 
opinion shift away from support for the ethno-nationalist and entity based politics that 
was predominant several years ago. This attitudinal shift appears to have been caused 
primarily by the destructive effects o f widespread corruption. Importantly, the direction 
o f this change is not toward democracy as a solution. The interview data gathered during 
this research suggests a shift toward political alienation. Research participants have 
expressed marginal faith in elected officials who are now viewed as self-serving, with
77
little respect for democracy and the rule o f law; especially the principle o f legibus 
solutus. Their social and economic needs are not being responded to. Some expressed 
that they would be willing to leave the country if  they were able. Others implied support 
for non-democratic means o f governance.
This thesis concludes therefore, that although Bosnia has been inching ever closer to 
European Union membership from an institutional and administrative perspective, 
democratization is now at risk because it’s educated elite have become politically 
alienated. The absence of an active democratic consensus among a democracy’s middle 
class is cause for concern. In stable democracies, the middle class is one o f several elite 
segments that possess resources, possess specialized talents, “hold authoritative positions 
in powerful public and private organizations and influential movements, and are therefore 
able to affect strategic decisions regularly” (Higley, Hoffinan-Lange, Kadushin, and 
Moore, 1991, p. 36). They provide an important influence balancing and synthesizing 
function in their competition with other elite hubs (ibid.). The active participation of a 
country's middle class in the political arena helps prevent zero-sum, wimier take all, 
majority decision making (Higley, Hoffinan-Lange, Kadushin, & Moore, 1991, p. 37). 
Despite the creation of democratic institutions and procedures, corrupt politicians are 
playing what Higley and Pakulski (2000) term “elite power games”. Bosnia's middle 
class recognizes that citizens are trapped in a circle o f corruption, patronage and 
clientelism. The boundaries o f horizontal and vertical accountability are damaged. Civil 
society cannot respond because it is essentially non-existent. Consequently Bosnia’s 
middle class may be changing their mind about democracy.
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The EU’s SAA is providing short term regional security advantages, as intended. 
However, pervasive corruption is preventing democracy from securing a foothold in 
Bosnian society. Wolfgang Petritsch’s early vision of Bosnians accepting ownership has 
proved predictably ineffective. Bosnia’s democracy will be no more than a façade unless 
its leaders come to value democracy’s essential principles. It is not sufficient for the 
European Union to reprimand Bosnian politicians about corruption at arm’s length while 
leaving the Bosnians to solve this problem by themselves. Rational choiee theory dietates 
that self-interested political actors are not altruistieally motivated. Rationality should be 
constrained by the accession process. The present incentive for politieal elites to ehange 
their behavior is not strong enough, and sinee sueh ehange would involve a loss o f 
personal and politieal benefits it will eertainly not eome voluntarily. Reforms requiring 
moral eommitment should be receiving the highest priority and oversight from Brussels. 
Bosnia’s movement forward in the long aeeession proeess should be made eonditional 
upon significant reductions in the levels of corruption. The European Union will have a 
diffieult time eontinuing to justify to average Bosnian eitizens the value o f vague and 
distant membership in the faee of severe soeial inequality. Moreover, Europe's Bosnia 
policy discourse needs to be realigned more with genuine publie eoneems, and away 
from the high-level politieal and économie issues. SAA poliey initiatives need to address 
the implications of corruption.
Legitimacy grants patience, flexibility and toleranee toward new governments. It is 
the foundation of demoeratie eonsolidation. Bosnia’s laek of popular legitimaey is 
resulting in impatienee. With EU membership realistieally more than a deeade away, 
Bosnia’s naseent demoeraey may ultimately be plaeed at risk. Bosnia could easily eaught
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in what Diamond terms an “authoritarian undertow” now affecting countries such as 
Nigeria, Russia, Thailand, Venezuela, and most recently Bangladesh and the Philippines 
(Diamond, 2008). Leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Venezuela’s Hugo 
Chavez immediately come to mind. One danger of declining legitimacy is that a 
disillusioned public may embrace an alternative form of government, either permanently 
or temporarily. Democratic turn-arounds are not uncommon. As Diamond (ibid.) points 
out, this occurred spontaneously in Nigeria in 1983, in Thailand in 1991, and in Peru in 
1992.
In addition, democratic institutions alone do not guarantee democracy and political 
legitimacy. More robust reform policies that develop democratic and ethical norms in 
governance need implementation, notably in the area of corruption. The Bosnian middle 
class need to be empowered because they are more apt to see tlirough rationalizations of 
policies and ideologies. They are also more qualified to recognize what is good for the 
public interest. To affect the behavior of politicians, the European Commission must 
modify the accession process and demand that Bosnian leadership meet its expectations 
for the rule o f law, justice, a better life, and a fairer society before allowing Bosnia to 
proceed further in the SAP.
It is not unreasonable to suggest that EU member countries and international donors 
will ultimately grow tired of funding Bosnia’s stagnant pre-accession process. The distant 
benefits of EU enlargement do not resonate well with today’s European voters. Domestic 
politics could potentially alter Bosnia’s accession. Italy is considering restricting 
Romanian migrants and the latest Eurobarometer poll on enlargement indicates support 
for only Croatia (The Economist, 2008). Also, Hazama (2007) has found that, on public
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support for EU enlargement, expectations o f democratization influence community 
attitudes, and were the most important determinant o f support for enlargement in the case 
of Turkey.
Recommended objectives of further research include interviews among a wider and 
more representative sample o f middle class citizens. Interview question topics could be 
added to examine the lack of confidence and influence middle class elites hold in Bosnian 
politics. The strong elite consensus described in this thesis should be manifesting itself as 
an active intervening influence in domestic and EU politics, but it is not.
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OPEN ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Loyalty
• What does loyalty mean to you?
• Do you think there are different types o f loyalty?
• How is your loyalty formed?
• Describe your loyalty to the Republika Srpska.
• Describe your loyalty to BiH.
• Describe your loyalty to the European Union.
• Describe your loyalty to the OHR.
Perceptions o f the Bosnian State Constitution
• What does the Constitution mean to you?
• What does it mean to be a good citizen?
• What is your understanding of democracy?
Perceptions o f Govermnent
When you think of government what comes to mind?
What things should a govermnent not do?
What are the major problems in Bosnia 
O f these problems which do you think are the most important?
In what ways does govermnent affect your life?
Do you feel that you have some say in how govermnent acts?
How much of the time do you think you can trust the govermnent?
Do you feel as if  you are well represented in government?
Who runs the govermnent?
In general what would you like to see different in Republika Srpska? Why? 
How do you feel about the European Union?
Is EU membership a higher priority than RS autonomy?
Corruption
• Have you experienced corruption personally?
100
Where does corruption occur?


























Subject demonstrated symptom of political alienation
Subject advocated non-democratic government
Subject commented about corruption
Subject commented about Dayton Peace Accord
Subject expressed discouragement with political or social situation
Subject commented about enviromnental issues
Subject commented about the European Union
Subject expressed fear o f revenge by corrupt individuals
Subject commented about Federation Entity
Subject expressed frustration with political or social situation
Subject commented about economic inequality
Subject commented about leaving Bosnia
Subject commented about loyalty to Country or Entity
Subject commented about corruption of medical field
Subject commented about OHR
Subject commented about civic participation (see VOTE)
Subject commented about political parties
Subject commented about government performance
Subject commented about police corruption
Subject commented about politicians
Subject commented about Republika Srpska
Subject commented about USA
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